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Theists and non-theists alike have generally taken absolute perfection to be a necessary 
condition for worship-worthiness. Unless the object is absolutely perfect, it is often put, 
the kinds of attitudes or actions constitutive of worship are unwarranted. In this thesis, I 
offer an account of worship-worthiness that does not take for granted that to be worship-
worthy is to be absolutely perfect. More specifically, I advance the claim that to be 
absolutely perfect is to be supremely worship-worthy and that supreme worship-
worthiness holds a unique position in this respect. For instance, I argue that to be 
absolutely perfect and thus supremely worship-worthy is to be necessarily worship-
worthy and uniquely worthy of an undivided worship. I arrive at this conclusion in a 
somewhat circuitous fashion in that the argument is premised on thin metaphysical and 
theological commitments so that the success of the argument is not contingent on 
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What is the relationship between the concept of worship-worthiness and an 
absolutely perfect being—that is, a being like God? Most basically, worship-worthiness 
as a concept involves the task of delivering an explanation of the fittingness of an act of 
worship. In virtue of what is a being worthy of worship? What is the basis in which an act 
of worship is rendered choiceworthy? Accordingly, worship-worthiness ostensibly would 
include facts about both the subject and the object of worship. Thinkers in the major 
monotheisms have conventionally taken the absolute perfection of God—that is, 
representatively, God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence—as the basis 
of God’s worship-worthiness. Absolute perfection, on this account, is a fact about God 
that delivers an explanation of the fittingness of all acts of worship directed to God. As 
the guiding question of this project indicates, I am interested in exploring the nature of 
this explanation of worship-worthiness. 
Towards an Account of Worship-Worthiness 
My interest in exploring the nature of this explanation of God’s worship-
worthiness is, in part, because theists generally have gone further than to say absolute 
perfection is a sufficient condition of worship-worthiness and taken it as a necessary and 
sufficient condition. For instance, “perfection claims,” according to Brian Leftow, “have 
roots in primary religious life. They arguably flow out of Western monotheist attitudes of 
worship, for arguably to see God as anything less than absolutely perfect would make 
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Him out not to deserve the sorts of attitudes Western monotheist worship involves."1 
Absolute perfection of the object of worship, then, amounts to a strict requirement for 
worship-worthiness whatever else the concept might entail. 
 Yujin Nagasawa has problematized the view that absolute perfection is a 
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. In an essay titled “The Grounds of Worship” 
and a series of response essays, Nagasawa and Tim Bayne challenge the notion that 
God’s worship-worthiness can adequately be grounded in terms of what they coin the 
maximal excellence account.2 The maximal excellence account construes God’s worship 
worthiness much in the way I have described above—worship-worthiness supervenes on 
the supreme degree of the intrinsic excellence of the divine nature. The challenges posed 
are both direct and indirect. The challenges found in “The Grounds of Worship” are 
indirect, considering that the objections are directed specifically at what they term the 
“obligation thesis”—the thesis that persons are obligated to worship God. The reasons 
they provide, then, purportedly show why persons are not obligated to worship God on 
the bases traditionally given. This is relevant insofar as the objections to the obligation 
thesis would count against what might be reasons of the right sort to worship God or 
there are shared reasons to think one ought to worship God and that God’s worship-
worthiness is related to the intrinsic value of God’s nature—though, the question of our 
obligation to worship God and God’s worship-worthiness are conceptually distinct.3 
                                                
1. Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 11.  
2. Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” Religious Studies 42 (2006): 299-
313. 
3. I shall not be addressing the question of whether persons are obligated to worship God, though 
it may be the case that if God’s worship-worthiness is related to his absolute perfection in the way typically 
thought by Anselmian theists, then our relationship to this perfect being might entail such an obligation. 
For what it is worth, St. Anselm himself thinks as much: “This is the kind of substance that is so pre-
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 Perhaps the most substantive and direct of Nagasawa’s objections to the maximal 
excellence account are found in the context of his broader project first defended in the 
groundbreaking essay “A New Defense of Anselmian Theism” and developed further in 
his recent monograph, Maximal God: A New Defense of Perfect Being Theism.4 The 
Maximal God approach is a significantly altered approach to traditional perfect being 
theism, leaving open as a matter of principle the possibility that whatever the greatest 
metaphysically possible being is, it may not be what he terms “omni God.” Omni God is 
the being that possesses the attributes of omnibenevolence, omniscience, and 
omnipotence. The core of the perfect being thesis, he contends, is that God is the greatest 
possible being—and while the greatest possible being may in fact be omni God, it could 
also be the case that it is metaphysically impossible for a being to be omnibenevolent, 
omniscient, and omnipotent due to any number of considerations such as the classical 
formulation of the problem of evil or conflicts between these attributes. Should omni God 
be impossible to exemplify, we ought to conclude then, not that God does not exist—or 
that there is no perfect being—but that the perfect being is something that falls short 
(however short is indeterminate) of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.  
 Considering objections to his new defense of perfect being theism, Nagasawa 
notes the possibility that the maximal God approach might entail that God is less 
worship-worthy or not worthy of worship at all: “Few perfect being theists would be 
                                                
eminently valuable that people have to worship it.” See “Monologion,” in Anselm of Canterbury: The 
Major Works, eds. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 80. 
4. Nagasawa, “A New Defence of Anselmian Theism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 58, no. 233 
(2008): 577-596; Nagasawa, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism (Oxford: Oxford 




willing to accept the maximal God approach if it can entail that God is not 
worshipworthy.”5 Nagasawa offers the following response to the objection. Suppose that 
some X is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, but only nearly omniscient. Suppose X knows all 
true propositions excluding one: P. However insignificant P is, says Nagasawa, God’s 
worship-worthiness becomes contingent on his knowing or not knowing P. X moves from 
not worship-worthy to worship-worthy as he comes to know P, and this is absurd. 
Accordingly, for Nagasawa, it would not necessarily follow that if God is less than omni-
perfect, he is any less worthy of worship. 
Even if the maximal excellence account is right, Nagasawa continues, he is 
unconvinced that “the maximal degree of intrinsic excellence” must refer to the omni-
attributes rather than to the maximal consistent set of great-making properties. 
Nagasawa’s approach to perfect being theism, then, poses a challenge to the notion that 
the basis of God’s worship-worthiness is his perfection (traditionally conceived) insofar 
as it in principle leaves open the possibility that there exists a worship-worthy being 
whose worship-worthiness consists in some combination of attributes short of absolute 
perfection. This nonstandard method in perfect being theology causes problems for any 
account of worship-worthiness that takes absolute perfection to be a necessary condition.  
Nagasawa’s work, including objections such as the ones mentioned above, has 
catalyzed the attention given to worship as a subject of philosophical inquiry and in large 
part has inspired this project. While many have responded to Nagasawa’s new defense of 
perfect being theism more generally, few have responded directly to his work on worship. 
                                                
5. Nagasawa, Maximal God, 104.  
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This is due, in part, to the relatively little amount of attention that has been given to the 
nature of worship in analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology.6  
This is not to say that the concept of worship-worthiness has not received 
substantive attention independently of Nagasawa’s prompting. Philosophers such as 
Robert Adams, William Wainwright, Mark Murphy, Brian Leftow, Paul Moser, Mark 
Wynn, Tom Morris, Richard Swinburne, Ninian Smart have reflected at varying lengths 
and with respect to varying purposes on the relationship between our concept of God and 
worship-worthiness.  
More directly, Mark Murphy stands out from among these philosophers in that he 
offers one of the most recent and developed accounts of worship-worthiness. In God’s 
Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil, Murphy responds to 
the potential concern that the account he defends of the normative elements of divine 
agency with respect to the problem of evil makes God out to be a being who is less than 
worship-worthy.7 He thus spells out in a preliminary fashion what worship-worthiness 
entails and why his account of God’s own ethics does not undermine God’s worship-
worthiness.  
According to Murphy, appropriate worship-worthiness relations presuppose and 
are partially constituted by having particular beliefs about and attitudes toward a potential 
object of worship. The appropriateness of such beliefs and attitudes finds its basis in what 
                                                
6. There are a number of important exceptions. For instance, see Terrence Cuneo, Ritualized 
Faith: Essays on the Philosophy of Liturgy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically: Philosophical Reflections on Religious Practice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
7. Mark Murphy, God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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would be reasons of the right sort to worship God. The content of such beliefs and 
attitudes ought to meet two conditions: “A being is worthy of worship by some person in 
this sense only when there is a massive inequality between that being and that person and 
the inequality is an inequality of a certain sort of value.”8 The value gap relation must be 
of an “inescapable and overriding” kind—one that bears practical priority over other 
kinds of value (instrumental, etc.). Similarly, the inequality condition is not one of mere 
degrees of value. Rather, the inequality, again, is of a certain kind, one in which the sorts 
of value are not even in competition with one another.  
The preliminary account of worship-worthiness offered by Murphy and the work 
of these other philosophers provides a variety of resources for sustained reflection on the 
relationship between worship-worthiness and absolute perfection. Still, no one has of yet 
developed and defended an extended account of worship-worthiness and consciously 
factored in and reflected upon at length objections of the type levied by Nagasawa. Over 
the course of this project, I intend to develop such an account.  
Towards this end, I will make constructive use of Murphy’s preliminary account 
of worship-worthiness in addition to the various contributions of other thinkers. To be 
more specific, I will be taking from Murphy’s work what I consider to be the key 
consideration for getting our minds around worship-worthiness—the notion of a massive 
inequality in value between the subject and object of worship. Throughout this project, I 
will be referring to this notion as the sufficient value inequality condition. Beyond this 
appropriation of Murphy’s account, I will proceed with an original account of worship-
worthiness and attempt to accommodate objections along the lines of Nagasawa’s. 
                                                
8. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 130. 
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Accordingly, I will not be proceeding on the assumption that absolute perfection is a 
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. Rather, I will argue for an account of 
worship-worthiness that admits of degrees. On the account I will defend, the minimum 
threshold of worship-worthiness—that is, the minimum distance between the subject and 
object requisite for appropriate worship—is satisfied when the sufficient value inequality 
condition is met. Once the minimum threshold is met, the worship-worthiness of a being 
increases proportionately with the value of that being to the upper limit of worship-
worthiness, which I will be referring to as supreme worship-worthiness (this term is also 
Murphy’s). Absolute perfection, then, corresponds to supreme worship-worthiness. 
Supreme worship-worthiness is the highest position on the scale of worship-worthiness. 
Accordingly, the principal aim of this project is to advance a concept of supreme 
worship-worthiness. Along these lines, I will be defending what I take to be two key 
features of supreme worship-worthiness: 1) necessary worship-worthiness and 2) the 
principle of undivided worship. 
Approach 
The nature of this accommodation to Nagasawa’s objection is somewhat 
provisional or instrumental. Ultima facie, it may be the case absolute perfection is a 
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. It would not be the case, on this account, that 
worship-worthiness would admit of degrees or that the sufficient value inequality 
condition could be satisfied by any being other than an absolutely perfect being. Over the 
course of this project, however, I will forgo what I consider to be the necessary 
metaphysical and theological commitments to make the case for absolute perfection as a 
necessary condition of worship-worthiness. Rather, I will be proceeding on somewhat 
 
 8 
metaphysically deflationary account, minimizing the metaphysical commitments required 
to get the argument off the ground as far as it is possible.  
One way to think of this approach might be in the vein of a Wittgensteinian 
ladder. Rather than arguing for the absolute uniqueness of supreme worship-worthiness 
with thicker concepts of God or classical theistic metaphysical commitments (those of St. 
Thomas Aquinas or St. Augustine, for instance), I will attempt to remain within the 
thinner metaphysical world of my interlocutors and of analytic philosophy in general, 
using its own procedures and resources and addressing their objections on their own 
terms. I will concede the multivalence of worship-worthiness for the sake of argument 
and then climb the ladder of multivalence (so to speak) up to supreme worship-
worthiness, where I will then set the terms for what it may look like to toss the ladder. If 
this approach is successful, I will effectively have placed us in the ballpark of an account 
of supreme worship-worthiness. On this account, the supremely worship-worthy being is 
unique insofar as (1) the supremely worship-worthy being is necessarily worship-worthy 
and (2) to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being one must worship the 
supremely worship-worthy being alone.  
Chapter Outline 
 Over the course of this chapter, I hope to have clearly stated the guiding question 
of this project and offered an explanation of what the question means. I have gestured at 
who some of the most relevant figures in the discussion are and how I hope to proceed in 
terms of my own account. In the second chapter I offer a defense and explanation of the 
sufficient value inequality condition. Along these lines, I also make a number of relevant 
qualifications, distinctions, and clarifications due to the relevantly underexplored nature 
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of worship-worthiness in the literature. In the third chapter I build on the account 
developed in the second chapter and offer a defense and explanation of what I take to be 
two key elements of an account of supreme worship-worthiness: necessary worship-
worthiness and the principle of undivided worship. In the concluding chapter I will offer 
several reflections on the possible implications of this project as well as what difference 
thicker concepts of God might make for an account of worship-worthiness. 
Contribution to Scholarship 
The aims of this project are relatively modest. I will not be attempting to establish 
any strong obligation to worship the supremely worship-worthy being or requirement to 
not worship any other being. I will not be attempting to establish that there are no 
worship-worthy beings other than the supremely worship-worthy being. Rather, it is my 
hope to advance the conversation in analytic philosophy and analytic theology on the 
topic of worship and worship-worthiness. Contemporary uses of the concept of worship-
worthiness have often taken for granted what the concept means and very few have 
offered independent accounts of the concept. Thus I take the account I will offer here as a 
novel contribution to the relatively new conversations surrounding worship-worthiness in 
that I will not be proceeding on the assumption that worship-worthiness requires absolute 
perfection. 
 Worship is one of the most central features of religion and perhaps the most 
central component of religion in the day-to-day lives of committed religious persons. If 
all that comes of this project is to bring more attention to the philosophical and 
theological relevance of a philosophically underdeveloped issue, I shall consider this a 
contribution, even if only a minimal one. Further, no one has of yet provided an account 
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of worship-worthiness of this length, and it is my hope that this project will provide 








WORSHIP-WORTHINESS AND THE SUFFICIENT VALUE INEQUALITY 
CONDITION 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an explanation and defense of the first half 
of the dual threshold account of worship-worthiness. The first threshold—the minimum 
threshold—is met when a being satisfies the sufficient value inequality condition and the 
second threshold—the maximum threshold—is met when (having already satisfied the 
minimum threshold) a being reaches absolute perfection. An absolutely perfect being is 
that being that exhibits the core great-making properties to the intrinsic maxima of their 
value. The sufficient value inequality condition is the key consideration for worship-
worthiness. Loosely defined, the condition states that for a being to be worthy of worship, 
the potentially worship-worthy being must be absurdly more valuable than any would-be 
worshipper of that being. Thus over the course of this chapter I defend the sufficient 
value inequality condition as key to understanding worship-worthiness at the minimum 
threshold.  
 Getting our minds around worship-worthiness will require number of 
clarifications and distinctions so that when I offer my own account, we will have all the 
relevant concepts distilled down to the point that there are only as many pieces to fit 
together as there are pieces needed to form an image and where the image will be clear 
and accurate. Toward that end, in the first section I identify what I consider to be a 
problematic move among some perfect being theologians who take worship-worthiness to 
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be a useful criterion in perfect being theology. Identifying these problems will illuminate 
the distinction between worship-worthiness and the sufficient greatness criterion in 
perfect being theology. In the second section, I suggest that the most helpful way of 
characterizing what kind of task it is to develop an account of worship-worthiness is in 
terms of a “reasons of the right sort account” of normativity. Next, I offer something of a 
provisional account of worship so that we have just enough of a working concept to get 
us into the discussion of what it might mean to deserve worship. This leads into the next 
section, where I identify a few existing accounts of worship-worthiness and attempt to 
show the relative strengths and failures of each. Having identified the problems that arise 
in the existing accounts of worship-worthiness, in the next section I proceed with an 
account that avoids the issues I have identified along the way. 
 One possible way of advancing the claims of this project would be to appeal to 
thicker concepts of God or of the grounding of value than are commonly in circulation in 
analytic philosophy. As I mentioned in the introduction, I do not intend to proceed in this 
way. Rather, I will be advancing the claims of this thesis on somewhat metaphysically 
deflationary grounds, forgoing controversial metaphysical assumptions as far as it is 
possible when addressing relevant problems that arise. In proceeding this way, I can 
address the common objections to the claims I will be advancing on their own terms, so 
to speak, so at to increase the likelihood that my responses will be convincing to those 
who do not share my metaphysical commitments.  
Worship-Worthiness and Perfect Being Theology 
 Developing an account of worship-worthiness is a distinct task from developing a 
concept of God and thus moves according to its own procedures. Attending to this 
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distinction is a helpful way to begin because it will give us a clearer view of the kinds of 
considerations that are and are not relevant to the development of an account of worship-
worthiness. Whether the concept of God intrinsically entails the concept of worship-
worthiness—analytically or otherwise—is an interesting question. However, for the 
purposes of this project, I will attempt to tease worship-worthiness apart from the concept 
of God for the sake of becoming clearer about what we mean when we use the concept 
and what the concept might entail apart from its association with the concept of God.  
 First, in many instances, the concept of worship-worthiness is employed in order 
to deliver for us certain results about the divine nature where the content of “worship-
worthiness” is assumed. Unless specific content can be given to the concept of worship-
worthiness independently of the commitments 1) to be God is to be worthy of worship 
and 2) to be worthy of worship is to be God, it is difficult to see the import of the concept 
in delivering specific attributes of God. Second, conflating worship-worthiness with the 
concept of God—more specifically, using worship-worthiness as some sort of sufficient 
greatness criterion in perfect being theology—fundamentally characterizes the nature of 
God in relation to creatures. This characterization is problematic for theism generally 
insofar as we are committed to standard ways of conceiving of God’s sovereignty.  
 For these reasons, I intend to treat the issue of developing an account of worship-
worthiness as distinct (though not wholly unrelated) from the task of perfect being 
theology. Along these lines, I will not be using “worship-worthy being” and “God” 
interchangeably. While I am committed to the view that God is worship-worthy, for the 
purposes of this project, I will not be assuming that all would-be worship-worthy beings 
are God. In fact, God’s worship-worthiness will only substantively be the topic of 
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conversation in the next chapter—that is, worship-worthiness in the supreme case. 
Throughout this chapter, when “God” is used in conversation with worship-worthiness, it 
will be for one of two reasons: 1) the existing literature on worship-worthiness almost 
exclusively discusses the nature of the concept in the context of God’s worship-
worthiness and 2) interacting with the ways people talk about God’s worship-worthiness 
is useful towards developing the more neutral account I defend in this chapter.  
 Consider an example from Katherine Roger’s Perfect Being Theology: “The 
starting assumption, shared by the vast majority of westerners past and present, whether 
theist or atheist, is that a being who is the source of all and a worthy object of worship 
must be the most perfect being possible.”1 For Rogers, what would make a being “a 
worthy object of worship” would make it the most perfect being possible. In the order of 
operations of coming to know the divine nature, worship-worthiness is the more 
fundamental property than perfection and is doing more of the conceptual work. At the 
least, securing worship-worthiness is the motivating force behind securing perfection: 
“We must define God as best as possible, otherwise we are imagining a finite being 
woefully limited by our own imperfections and hence undeserving of our worship.”2  
 The intuitive appeal of this approach is clear. It may be that there is a certain kind 
of unreserved and whole-hearted worship typically thought of by the devout as 
appropriate to give only to a being than which we could not conceive of a greater. If there 
                                                
1. Katherine Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), vii. 
In another place, Rogers says “maximal perfection seems to entail maximal praise worthiness. If God is not 
maximally praiseworthy, then we can conceive of a greater being, one who is maximally praiseworthy. See 
Rogers, “Anselm on Praising a Necessarily Perfect Being,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 34 (1993): 41-52. 
2. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology, 2.  
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are two impressive beings but one significantly more so than the other, perhaps we ought 
to direct our worship to the more impressive of the two. But if this is true and God is the 
limiting case of worship-worthiness, then God must also be the limiting case of greatness. 
Accordingly, we can take worship-worthiness as some sort of criterion in perfect being 
theology. God has those properties that would make him worthy of worship. As a direct 
example, Nelson Pike deduces a specific divine attribute in a case study following a 
similar procedure:  
(1) To worship x is to act as if one believes x to be conscious or aware. 
(2) If x is not conscious or aware, then to act toward x as if one believes x to be 
conscious or aware is to act in a way that is inappropriate and unfitting to x’s 
nature. 
(3) Therefore: If x is not conscious and aware, to worship x is to act toward x in a 
way that is inappropriate and unfitting to x’s nature. 
(4) If to worship x is to act in a way that is inappropriate and unfitting to xnature, 
then x is not an appropriate or fitting object of worship. (This premise follows 
from the fact that if x is an appropriate or fitting object of worship, then to 
worship x is to act toward x in a way that is appropriate and fitting to x’s nature.) 
(5) Therefore: If x is not conscious and aware, x is not an appropriate object of 
worship. ‘x is worthy of worship’ entails ‘x is conscious and aware.’3 
 
While worship-worthiness is already doing some heavy lifting here, Paul Moser goes 
further. For Moser, not only is worship-worthiness a suitable criterion in perfect being 
theology, it is in fact the only suitable criterion. Any argument about the existence of God 
that does not also establish the existence of a worship-worthy being is to fail to 
demonstrate anything about God: “Advocates of natural theology have the massive 
burden of establishing via an argument limited to natural sources of evidence that a 
                                                
3. Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), 152-153.  
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personal agent worthy of worship exists.”4 Inquiry into the divine nature, then, proceeds 
along these lines, yielding such results as, “Something will be worthy of worship only if 
it is morally without defect. Something (or, better, someone) will satisfy the title ‘God,’ 
then, only if that thing (or one) is morally perfect, and this perfection must be inherent 
rather than borrowed.”5 Moser is unconvinced that arguments terminating in the existence 
of some first cause or unmoved mover  have any relevance for the existence or nature of 
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Accordingly, Moser argues we can get 
entailments from the nature of what it is to be worthy of worship to the nature of what it 
is to be God:  
Part of God’s will, if God is worthy of worship, would include unselfish love for 
others, and direct acquaintance with such love would be de re…. If God is worthy 
of worship, and hence morally perfect self-sufficiently, then God is in a 
distinctive category relative to our familiar world.6 
Satisfying a morally perfectionist title ‘God,’ a God worthy of worship would aim 
to be relationally curative in probing towards humans. From the standpoint of 
moral perfection and hence of worthiness of worship, God would be defective in 
lacking a relationally curative aim and practice toward humans.7 
                                                
4. Paul Moser, The Severity of God: Religion and Philosophy Reconceived (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 123. See also Paul Moser, The God Relationship: The Ethics for 
Inquiry about the Divine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
5. Paul Moser, The Severity of God, 12-13. 
6 Paul Moser, The God Relationship, 11-12. 
7. Paul Moser, The God Relationship, 43. Daniel Hill has in common with Moser this notion that 
the moral character of a being is the primary consideration for worship-worthiness. Among the various 
attributes that make up divine greatness, “moral praiseworthiness is one of the most valuable lot.” “moral 
praise worthiness forms a central part of the worship-worthiness of a divine being.” See Daniel Hill, 
Divinity and Maximal Greatness (New York: Routledge, 2005), 215. See also, Charles Lewis, “Divine 




 In spite its intuitional appeal, the conflation of the two tasks results in a host of 
issues. First, it is noteworthy that in cases such as Moser’s, there is rarely any real estate 
dedicated to an actual exposition and defense of the concept of worship-worthiness. 
There are certain prereflective intuitions about what worship-worthiness might entail 
operating here, but for the most part the content of the concept—that is, what would 
make a being worthy of worship—is assumed. Unless it can be shown that being worthy 
of worship entails being “morally perfect self-sufficiently,” independently of the 
assumption that to be worship-worthy just is to be whatever God is and God must be 
morally perfect, it is not clear what import the concept has for developing a concept of 
God. There is a redundancy to the procedure without an independent account of what 
worship-worthiness entails. Without a filled-out and independent concept of worship-
worthiness, the procedure has the potential just to yield the results the operator wishes the 
procedure to yield.8  
 Additional problems with the above approach arise when we begin to fill out the 
concept of worship-worthiness and become more specific about what we mean when we 
employ the concept. Principally, worship-worthiness is fundamentally a relational notion. 
Worship-worthiness is not an intrinsic property of any one being. Rather, worship-
                                                
8. Another more developed example might be Mark Wynn’s God and Goodness: A Natural 
Theological Perspective, where he considers “how an examination of the nature of worship may furnish an 
understanding of the concept of God.” Critiquing Swinburne’s concept of God, Wynn argues “if we are to 
find Swinburne’s approach religiously adequate, we will want some reassurance that the God he portrays 
remains sufficiently different from human beings to ensure that he is worthy of worship, although they are 
not.” See God and Goodness (New York: Routledge, 1999), 142-46. Wynn offers something of a 
preliminary account of worship-worthiness saying that worship is “a fitting response to God, not only 
virtue of God’s metaphysical ultimacy, but also in virtue of his or her inherent goodness,” “as the 
primordial expression of existence” and “the radiant attractiveness of God in himself or herself.” See 155-
68. I think there is something to these preliminary remarks. But the “metaphysical ultimacy” of God is 
something that would require a great deal of unpacking; and in unpacking what metaphysical ultimacy 
entails, it is hard to imagine one could do this without making the metaphysical commitments I have 
decided to forgo. 
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worthiness is a property that supervenes on the relation of two parties. To be worship-
worthy is to be worthy of some agent’s worship. A being never appropriately worships 
himself.9 The import of this feature of worship-worthiness in the case of using the 
concept as a criterion in developing a concept of God is that God’s own nature becomes 
essentially determined as God-in-relation-to some creature. God’s fundamental nature 
becomes characterized in terms of something that is not God. As Mark Murphy points 
out, not only is it an “anathema for the Anselmian, but a mistake in terms of theism 
generally, to take God’s fundamental nature to be defined relationally, especially when it 
seems possible that God might have never created.”10 While the concern to guarantee 
God’s worship-worthiness is certainly an admirable enterprise, it is not clear that the 
procedures above can be run without in one way or another obtaining its results at the 
cost of other general concerns of perfect being theism regarding sovereignty. 
 An advocate of the worship-worthiness criterion in perfect being theology may 
take issue with the characterization above. Perhaps there is a way to avoid a strong kind 
of metaphysical characterization of God’s relation to creatures. That is, in employing 
worship-worthiness as a kind of sufficient greatness criterion, the criterion does not entail 
that God depends on creatures in any kind of way for God’s existence or nature. Nothing 
                                                
9. Ninian Smart, The Concept of Worship (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1972), 26-
27; James Rachels, “God and Human Attitudes,” Religious Studies (1971): 331. There may be an initial 
concern here about the christological implications of the claim that no person appropriately worships 
himself. The man Jesus appears at times clearly to be worshipping the Father in the Gospels. This seems to 
me to be a problem of the standard christological kind where there is pressure to affirm apparently 
contradictory things about Christ’s divine and human nature. Christ is passible in his human nature but 
impassible in his divine nature, for instance. I suspect that the standard ways to go about resolving these 
tensions could be applied to the issue of the second person of the Trinity worshipping God the Father as the 
God-man.  
10. Mark Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 18. 
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is true about God’s nature in se in virtue of some state of affairs other than God’s nature. 
Maybe the heart of the procedure is epistemic—that is, perhaps worship-worthiness 
provides an epistemic way into the divine nature. Creatures can come to know certain 
things about God through the use of this criterion without saying that God is dependent in 
some way on creatures. This is not enough to get us out of trouble.  
 Getting more specific about the fundamentally relational feature of worship-
worthiness raises a related problem. Take, for example, my suggestion that the key 
feature of a worship-worthiness relation is the value inequality condition. The conflation 
of the concept of worship-worthiness with the concept of God—that is, characterizing the 
nature of God in relation to creatures—runs the risk of limiting the excellence of God in 
our conceptualization to the kinds of creatures that exist in the world. If worship-
worthiness serves as some kind of criterion of sufficient greatness for God, then God only 
needs to be as great as to meet the minimum threshold to be worthy of worship by 
existing creatures in the actual world. If there is any truth to the value inequality 
condition, then the value inequality condition means that the greatness of God becomes 
variable on the greatness of the creatures that exist. Had there existed creatures much 
more impressive than humans, using worship-worthiness as a criterion of sufficient 
greatness would raise the bar, so to speak, necessary for God to be great enough to be 
God. God would be a much more impressive being in this world than in a world where 
humans are the most impressive creatures. With this understanding of worship-
worthiness, the minimum level of greatness requisite for worship-worthiness just is the 
level of God’s greatness. Consequently, in our conceptualization, God ends up being a 
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less impressive being in this world than he would have to be if there existed more 
impressive creatures.11 
 Consider a final reason against configuring worship-worthiness as some kind of 
sufficient greatness criterion in perfect being theology. If perfect being theology and 
developing an account of worship-worthiness share one and the same task—establishing 
the existence of God and/or some set of divine attributes—then those who would set 
themselves to the worship-worthiness task inherit the challenges commonly faced by 
perfect being theologians. It would be a reason in favor of any account of worship-
worthiness, then, if from step one it separates itself from these issues before facing the 
kinds of problems that might arise that are unique to its own task.  
Reasons for Action 
 How ought we then to characterize the task of developing an account of worship-
worthiness? A useful way of circumscribing worship-worthiness is in terms of a 
judgment made by a worshipper concerning what the worshipper has good reason to do 
given certain beliefs and attitudes about a potential object of worship. Constitutive of 
worship-worthiness, then, is the worshipper’s possessing reasons of the right sort to 
worship. “Reasons of the right sort” is a popular topic of conversation among those 
writing on the nature of normativity. I have no one explanation to offer of what exactly 
reasons of the right sort account of normativity means or all it might entail, but Mark 
                                                
11. The objector might reply: It seems, then, that absolute perfection is the only non-arbitrary 
threshold high enough to guarantee God’s worship-worthiness by all creatures other than God regardless of 
how impressive they are. This may well be the case. But necessary worship-worthiness is not what is under 
discussion at the moment. And this is only a problem for the distinction I am making if the only kind of 
worship-worthiness is necessary worship-worthiness. This too, ultima facie, may be the case. But as I have 
stated in the introduction, I have decided to forego the kinds of metaphysical and ontological commitments 
that would be required to make this case, say, if there existed an ontologically simple being, for example. 
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Murphy’s illustration is helpful towards understanding the relevance of this concept in 
the case of worship-worthiness:  
If a powerful person can credibly threaten me with all sorts of terrible evils if I do 
not worship him, that does give me reason to worship him: the reason to avoid 
these terrible evils. (Of course, I should not worship him. But that there are 
reasons to do so is obvious from the fact that there is some point to my 
worshipping him, that you would not find unmotivated and unintelligible.) But the 
presence of these reasons does not contribute to making this threatener worthy of 
worship.12 
 
This suggests, as William Wainwright does, that normatively, “‘being a logically 
appropriate object of worship’ and ‘deserving worship’ are each built into the concept of 
worship.”13 Nelson Pike illustrates this distinction with an analogy:  
If I were to propose marriage to the Mona Lisa, I would be acting inappropriately 
with respect to this object. The Mona Lisa is not (what might be called) a 
logically appropriate object of the emotions and appetites expressed by this 
action. The action would reveal that I had made a factual mistake about the 
features of the Mona Lisa or that I was suffering from a pathological condition 
akin to phobia. But now let’s suppose that I propose marriage to Mrs. Jones who 
is happily married to Mr. Jones. Here my action would not be logically 
inappropriate, though it might be morally or socially improper.14 
 
In Murphy’s illustration, the threats of the powerful person make him a logically 
appropriate object of worship in some sense even if the threats fail to make him deserving 
of worship objectively speaking or in the mind of the one threatened.  
 Moreover, a reason to worship does not become a reason of the right sort simply 
in virtue of that reason’s being characterized by the feature that the worshipper believes 
the object deserves worship. Devil worshippers take Satan to be both a logically 
                                                
12. Mark Murphy, Gods Own Ethics, 129-31.  
13. William Wainwright, “Two (or Maybe One and a Half) Cheers for Perfect Being Theism,” 
Philo 12, no. 2 (2009): 230. See also William Wainwright, “Assessing Ontological Arguments,” European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2012): 19-39.  
14. Pike, God and Timelessness, 156.  
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appropriate object of worship and deserving of worship. While Satan would qualify as a 
logically appropriate object of worship, it is hard to imagine any one account of worship-
worthiness could accommodate both the kinds of reasons devil worshippers would take 
Satan to be worship-worthy and the kinds of reasons theists generally take God to be 
worship-worthy. The devil and God are such fundamentally different beings that reasons 
of the right sort to worship one would have to disqualify the reasons of the other as being 
of the right sort.15  
 Along these lines, the task of developing an account of worship-worthiness is to 
develop an account of reasons of the right sort to worship a being. What constitutes the 
choiceworthiness of an act of worship? What considerations count in favor of an act of 
worship? What makes an act of worship an act worth performing?16 Importantly, 
characterizing worship-worthiness in this way is to frame the issue in terms of justifying 
reasons for worship rather than requiring reasons. A justifying reason, loosely, is a reason 
in virtue of which an action becomes a reasonable or permissible thing to do. A requiring 
reason, loosely, is a reason in virtue of which not performing a given action is 
unreasonable or impermissible. The question of whether worshipping some being is 
permissible given the nature of the relationship between the worshipper and the would-be 
                                                
15. This is not to say that the respective reasons would share no features in common. For example, 
both the devil worshipper and the worshipper of God might take one reason the object of their worship is 
worship-worthy to be that they are powerful. But the differences in reasons would far outweigh the features 
in common. If power were the only consideration for worship-worthiness, either both parties would have to 
grant that both God and the devil are worship-worthy or would have to argue that one’s power is a different 
kind than the other. Given that neither party is likely to do the former, in following the latter the 
differentiation between the beings would reveal other mutually exclusive values (for example, theists might 
qualify the value of God’s power in virtue of God’s goodness, while the devil worshipper would not make 
the parallel move).  
16. Mark Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 9. 
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worship-worthy being is distinct from the question of whether this relation, all things 
considered, might make not worshipping a being impermissible. The aim of this project is 
to lay out the conditions under which the former relation might obtain. 
Worship, Allegiance, and Total Devotion 
 In order to have some semblance of what might count as reasons of the right sort 
to worship, some attention must be given to the question of what it means to worship. 
Towards that end, in the present section I will offer a somewhat thin or provisional view 
of worship. Accordingly, I identify the main features of worship and attempt not to 
commit myself to any one controversial or thick view about the nature of the concept. A 
thin concept of worship will be sufficient to get an account of worship-worthiness up and 
running. To identify these main features, it will be helpful to place worship aside other 
concepts often related to, associated with, or commonly thought to be entailed by the 
concept. This way, I can point out important similarities and differences between these 
concepts. Most basically, I take worship to be the appropriate response to a certain kind 
of value. This response includes communicating in one way or another, however directly 
or indirectly, the superiority of the object of worship and relative inferiority or 
nothingness of the worshipper. This puts expressive action at the heart of worship.  
 Still, worship is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down. Murphy sums up 
what we are talking about at the most basic level when we employ the concept: “Worship 
is a phenomenon involving beliefs, attitudes, and actions. To worship some being 
presupposes and is partially constituted by having a set of beliefs and attitudes towards 
that being. The actions that worship involves are actions that express, in more or less 
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direct ways, those beliefs and attitudes.” 17 The difficulty in pinning down the concept 
comes in when we attempt to set a range of which beliefs, attitudes, and actions can 
properly be considered constitutive of worship. 
 Given the ambiguity of the concept, it is no surprise that worship can become a 
catch-all term for all kinds of diverse religious, aesthetic, or even ethical attitudes and 
behaviors. I take worship to be fundamentally a response to certain sort of value. But 
what is the range of appropriate responses to that value and what kind of value do we 
mean? Is worship an attitude consisting of a combination of attitudes often associated 
with worship (gratitude, love, reverence, fear, awe, respect, admiration) or is worship sui 
generis? For instance, Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa note that “canonical instances of 
worship appear to involve moral, affective, aesthetic, and numinal attitudes,”18 and in 
“many religious traditions worship is also taken to involve more straightforward 
emotional attitudes, such as love.”19  
 James Rachels argues that, given the kind of thing worship is, there cannot even 
in principle be a worship-worthy being: “in admitting that a being is worthy of worship 
we would be recognizing him as having an unqualified claim on our obedience.”20 The 
unqualified nature of the demand on our obedience is problematic for Rachels because it 
requires a certain surrendering of our moral agency: “What we have, then, is a conflict 
between the role of worshipper, which by its very nature commits one to total 
                                                
17. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 130. 
18. Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa, “Grounds of Worship,” 301. 
19. Bayne and Nagasawa, “Grounds of Worship,” 300.  
20. Rachels, “God and Human Attitudes,” 334.  
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subservience to God, and the role of moral agent, which necessarily involves autonomous 
decision-making.”21 There is an overriding character of the obedience that follows from 
our recognition of a worship-worthy being that compromises the very heart of what it 
means to make moral decisions. At any point where our commitment to obedience comes 
into conflict with other moral obligations, the commitment that follows on any 
recognition of a worship-worthy being takes precedence over competing commitments. 
Scott Aikin expresses the same sentiment: 
For any rational moral agent (A), if A worships x, A’s worship of x is the joint 
performance of three acts: 
a. A is unconditionally obedient to x and to the demands that x’s existence 
and properties place on A, 
b. A views x as absolutely worthy of worship, and 
c. A performs rituals or communicates acts expressing 3a and 3b.22 
 
For Aikin, any kind of expressive act of worship entails also that the whole of the 
worshipper’s life is owed to God. Aikin concedes that the concept of worship deserves 
further examination: “Does worship require obedience? If it requires obedience, does it 
require complete obedience? My answers have been affirmative, but I may be wrong. 
Worship may be purely expressive and nothing more.”23 
 Rachels’ and Aikin’s construal of worship, wrong or right, at the least is not ad 
hoc. Their understanding of worship shares several features with accounts generally 
offered by theists. On the notion that worship entails obedience, here is Moser:  
Characteristically, worship involves not only adoration and submission but also a 
welcoming commitment to the perfect goodness and authority of the recipient of 
worship. Worthiness of worship, as many people understand it, requires of a 
                                                
 21. Rachels, “God and Human Attitudes,” 335.  
22. Scott Aikin, “The Problem of Worship,” Think 9, no. 25 (2010): 3. 
23. Scott Aikin, “The Problem of Worship,” 11.  
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recipient of worship the worthiness of a person’s commitment to, or trust in, the 
perfect goodness and authority of that recipient.24 
Worship, then, not uncommonly, is understood to entail this rather strict obligation to 
recognize the authority any being who is worthy of worship would have over the 
worshipper.  
 But is it the case that worship is necessarily an obedience-entailing concept? It 
may be possible that objections of the kinds levied by Rachels and Aikin and the 
description of worship by theists such as Moser place too great a conceptual burden on 
worship. This is relevant for our purposes insofar as the difference between an obedience-
entailing and a nonobedience-entailing concept of worship seems to entail a weaker and a 
stronger concept of worship-worthiness. And it may be the case that a stronger concept of 
worship-worthiness would require additional criteria over the weaker one. 
  Perhaps Moser, Rachels, and Aikin have in mind more the notion of what Robert 
Adams calls total devotion. Total devotion is transparent as to its obedience-entailing 
quality: “Religious devotion is more than wholeheartedness or unconflicted enthusiasm. 
It is supposed to occupy a person’s life so fully that nothing is left outside the realm in 
which it reigns.”25 The significance of this definition is that total devotion includes 
worship alongside other concepts such as obedience, wholeheartedness, trust, and love. 
Could it be the case that a being could be worthy of our worship but not our total 
devotion?  
                                                
24. Moser, The Severity of God, 12.  
25. Robert Adams, “The Problem of Total Devotion” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral 
Commitment: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William Wainwright (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1896), 170. 
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 Aquinas, for example, argues that worship is an act included within the broader 
virtue of religion, where the good of religion consists in rendering the honor due to God. 
Along with worship, however, are other acts Aquinas considers distinct from worship, 
even if belonging to the same grouping of actions under the good of religion:  
Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to 
pray, to sacrifice and many such like…. By the one same act man both serves and 
worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is 
due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under 
an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed 
to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and 
to his own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by 
assuming something Divine.26  
 
It is the all-encompassing nature of concepts such as total devotion of Aquinas’ notion of 
religion that create problems for theists who take total devotion to be the required 
disposition to take towards God because of its alleged conflict with our autonomy in 
moral decision making. But the problems presented are problems for worship only 
insofar as worship as a concept intrinsically entails a total devotion characteristic of more 
comprehensive concepts such as Aquinas’ understanding of religion.27 
                                                
26. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 81, a. 2, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (London: Benzinger Brothers Inc., 1920), http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3081.htm. It is 
difficult to say whether in Aquinas’ treatise on religion he treats worship as an obedience-entailing concept. 
We see here that he at least treats them as acts performed with respect to different aspects; that is, worship 
is the proper response to God with respect to its end of valuing the divine excellence and service the proper 
response with respect to “his condition” as one subject to God. To bear witness to the Divine excellence 
can be teased apart—at least conceptually—from bearing witness to our subjection to God. To take 
Aquinas’ view on religion and justice as a whole, I am not sure that we can get a view of out Aquinas that 
says it is possible for a being to be worthy of our worship but not of our obedience on those grounds, even 
if only because any worship-worthy being would also satisfy the necessary conditions of authority 
whatever they might be. For a thorough treatment of Aquinas’ notion of worship, see Robert Staudt, 
Religion as a Virtue: Thomas Aquinas on Worship Through Justice, Law, and Charity (PhD diss., Ave 
Maria University, Ave Maria, FL, 2008).  
27. While it is outside the scope of this project to take up this issue, I would not be willing to 
concede that the more wholistic concepts such as total devotion cause the problems Rachels and Aikin 
think it does.  
 
 28 
 Murphy argues, pace Moser, Aiken, and Rachels, that there is a relevant 
distinction between worship-worthiness and what he terms allegiance-worthiness. 
Consider what it means for some agent to have authority over another person. On one 
prevailing account, for some X to have authority over Y is for X’s dictates to be related in 
some way to Y’s reasons for action. One aspect of this relation is control. By control, 
Murphy means, in part, that X’s dictates are constitutive of Y’s reasons for action. X’s 
command “actualizes a state of affairs that is itself part of the reason for action”28 for Y—
“The content of the dictate and what the dictate actualizes a reason to do must be 
identical; and the dictates must be themselves parts of the reasons for action 
actualized.”29 These reasons are decisive, meaning, “R is a decisive reason for A to φ just 
in case R is a reason that makes φ-ing ultima facie reasonable for A and not  φ-ing ultima 
facie unreasonable for A…. In the absence of defeating conditions, the authoritative 
party’s commands decisively determine what the other ought to do in that domain.”30  
Thus for Murphy, to say that a being such as God has authority over creatures is 
for “God’s commands that created rational beings φ constitutively actualize decisive 
reasons for created relational beings to φ.”31 But on Murphy’s account, the attributes that 
make up absolute perfection are not sufficient for an absolutely perfect being’s 
commands to constitutively actualize decisive reasons for rational creatures. 
The Anselmian being’s omnipotence entails that the Anselmian being stands in a 
causal relationship to creaturely agency, such that the Anselmian being can 
control the circumstances of creaturely agency at will, but it does not suggest that 
                                                
28. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 11. 
29. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 13. 
30. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 14.  
31. Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority, 16. 
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the Anselmian being stands in a certain normative relationship to creatures, that 
is, that the Anselmian being’s say-so always completes a reason for action of the 
relevant content. The Anselmian being’s omniscience entails that the Anselmian 
being will be aware of the stock of creaturely reasons, but not that that being will 
be able to add to that stock by issuing directives. The Anselmian being’s (alleged) 
perfect moral goodness may tell us something about what the stock of reasons is 
or how we may act on them, but, again, gives no basis for thinking that the 
Anselmian being can add to that stock of reasons by that being’s say-so.32 
 
Neither is practical authority a perfection like omniscience or omnipotence are. 
First, given that the existence of rational creatures is contingent, one cannot say 
that it is constitutive of this perfection that the Anselmian being is actually 
authoritative over anyone…. But, suppose we say that this perfection is just to be 
understood counterfactually: the perfection is being such that if there were any 
rational creatures, then the Anselmian being would be authoritative over them. 
This would still be problematic, for it would seem that any such counterfactually 
characterized feature of the Anselmian being would be grounded in categorical 
features of that being. But, as I have claimed, there are no good arguments from 
such categorical perfections to the Anselmian being’s bearing authority over 
whatever rational creatures may exist.33 
 
Thus widespread as it is, it appears the notion that worship-worthiness is allegiance-
worthiness-entailing is not without its own substantive difficulties  
If it is possible to move forward with an account of worship-worthiness without 
having to commit myself either to the view that worship is an obedience-entailing 
concept or that worship is not an obedience-entailing concept, I will do so because of the 
complexity of the conversations surrounding the issue of authority generally and divine 
authority in particular (a question which in itself could occupy one’s attention well 
beyond the scope of this project). On one hand, it seems that if worship is an obedience 
or total-devotion entailing concept, then worship-worthiness turns out to be a much 
                                                
32. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 140. Murphy offers a chapter-length defense of these abbreviated 
arguments in An Essay on Divine Authority, 46-69.  
33. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 140-41. 
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stronger concept than if it were not an obedience-entailing concept and thus the worship-
worthiness judgment requires stronger grounding. Perhaps there is no rough-and-ready or 
functioning concept of worship sufficiently vague so as to please both groups.  
Perhaps, on the other hand, there is some room to remain non-committal for the 
purposes of this project, given that the best defenses of both the stronger and the weaker 
notions of worship-worthiness appeal to the same grounding for their positions, only the 
stronger notion, so to speak, gets more mileage out of the one grounding. That is, both the 
obedience-entailing and the non-obedience-entailing concepts of worship take worship-
worthiness to be grounded in the relative value of the worship-worthy being in 
comparison to non-worship-worthy beings (even if the weaker notion would require 
additional grounds for the authority-obedience relation to obtain).  
Rather than place myself firmly on one side or the other, I will be proceeding on 
the assumption that I can remain non-committal with respect to the issue of the 
relationship between worship and total devotion. Perhaps we can place the differences 
between these accounts of worship in a stronger and a weaker notion of the obedience 
that the value differential condition can ground. In this case, in the instance of the upper-
limit of worship-worthiness, the beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, and desires of one who 
truly recognizes the absolute greatness of the object of worship are strong enough that the 
range of kinds of actions that would adequately express  these beliefs, attitudes, 
dispositions, and desires would amount to a submission of oneself to the governance of 
this supremely worship-worthy being. This would be the weaker notion of the obedience 
in that it is characterized by a condition. If one adequately responds to the value of the 
supremely worship-worthy being, then one will place oneself under the authority of this 
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being and would be doing something unreasonable or altogether incompatible with one’s 
other beliefs and attitudes if one did not, given the strength of these beliefs and 
attitudes.34 The stronger of the notions of obedience thought to be grounded in the value 
differential condition is to say that necessarily all rational beings stand in this relation to 
the supremely worship-worthy being, that is, normatively speaking, are under its 
authority regardless of what other reasons one may or may not have. The difference 
between the two accounts, then, is between a contingently obedience-entailing and a 
necessarily obedience-entailing concept of worship in the case of supreme worship-
worthiness. Maybe this is a difference both sides would be content to solve another day 
as a second order issue in worship-worthiness.35 
 From this point, we can ask certain questions about how direct the connection 
between our actions and the intention to worship needs to be for an action to properly be 
considered an act of worship. Many have noted the kinds of actions typically associated 
with worship in the most direct or ritual sense such as bending the knee, bowing, or 
offering sacrifices—actions that it one way or another directly (however symbolically) 
communicate the superiority of the worshipped.36 Others note, as Richard Swinburne 
does, “Many different acts constitute worship according to their context—taking off 
                                                
34. This is based on a similar formulation made by Murphy in a chapter on divine authority and 
divine perfection in An Essay on Divine Authority, 136-37.  
35. I do not have sufficient time or space to allow the obedience-entailing or non-obedience-
entailing quality of worship to be an additional variable in the mix. Nor do I want to hang the success of my 
project on taking the right side of a controversial debate about the nature of divine authority.  
36. Peter Appleby, “On Religious Attitudes,” Religious Studies no. 6 (1970): 359; J. N. Findlay, 
“Can God’s Existence Be Disproved?” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, eds. Anthony Flew and 
Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955), 49; Smart, 26. 
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shoes, singing, dancing, saying certain things, etc.”37 The context of the action has some 
bearing on the scope of the kinds of actions that might be considered an act of worship. 
One need not be in a church or synagogue to perform worshipful actions properly 
speaking. These actions are actions that in one way or another express, however directly 
or indirectly, the relevant beliefs and attitudes about the object of worship. The breadth of 
the scope of the kinds of actions that can properly be considered worship is, in my 
thinking, a live question. I will return to this issue and its relevance for developing an 
account of supreme worship-worthiness in the next chapter. 
Existing Accounts of Worship-Worthiness 
If it is the case, however, that “deserving worship” is built into the concept of 
worship, it may be that we cannot arrive at a tolerable concept of worship before diving 
into worship-worthiness. In this sense, maybe there is some extent to which one must 
learn to swim by jumping into the pool. Accordingly, in the next section I will explore 
what I take to be the more compelling of the available accounts of worship-worthiness. 
Interacting with these accounts will provide opportunities to reflect on what is helpful 
and what is not, what works and what does not. Identifying the problems that arise in the 
existing accounts of worship-worthiness will allow me to address them in turn as I 
provide my own account in the following section. 
While there has been little attention given to the actual content of the concept of 
worship-worthiness in the literature, there has been a handful of noteworthy attempts. 
Each of the accounts I will address can be loosely categorized into three main kinds—
                                                
37. Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 293. 
 
 33 
creation-based accounts, salvation-based accounts, and maximal excellence accounts.38 
Many such accounts present reasons as to why persons are obligated to worship God. I 
will set aside the issue of whether these reasons are sufficient to ground an obligation and 
treat them simply as reasons that may or may not qualify as reasons of the right sort to 
worship a being. 
In Faith and Reason, Swinburne briefly offers reasons for worship representative 
of the creation-based accounts.39  
If there is a God and he has made and sustains the world and issued commands to 
men, men have moral obligations which they would not otherwise have. The 
grounds for this are as follows. Men ought to acknowledge other persons with 
whom they come into contact, not just ignore them—and this surely becomes a 
duty when those persons are our benefactors. We acknowledge people in various 
ways when we meet them, e.g. by shaking hands or smiling at them, and the way 
in which we acknowledge their presence reflects our recognition of the sort of 
individual they are and the kind of relation they have to us. Worship is the only 
response appropriate to God, the source of all being.40 
 
Swinburne here characterizes God’s worship-worthiness as a kind of expression of 
respect and gratitude to a benefactor. We owe worship to God as the one on whom we 
depend for our existence. God’s unique position as creator ex nihilo means that the kind 
                                                
38 Bayne and Nagasawa list brute fact accounts and prudential-reasons accounts alongside these 
three but I am not aware of anyone who defends these accounts with any seriousness. The brute fact 
account, according to Bayne and Nagasawa, holds that worship-worthiness is simply a brute property of 
God, a property that cannot be explained in virtue of some other fact about God. Murphy’s response to the 
notion that perhaps divine authority is a perfection could equally be applied in this case. The prudential-
reasons account maintains that worshipping God might be in our best interest, either because failing to 
worship God would be punishable by damnation or, more charitably, because God has created us such that 
it would be useful to us to worship him. It is hard to see that groundless worship or any reason for worship 
characterized by self-interest could be a reason of the right sort. With Bayne and Nagasawa I dismiss these 
accounts as serious candidates for their lack of philosophical appeal and will not address them here, given 
their lack of representation in the literature. See “Grounds of Worship,” 299-313. Elsewhere Nagasawa and 
Campbell Brown entertain the divine-command account of worship-worthiness and find it lacking. See “I 
Can’t Make You Worship Me,” Ratio 18 (2006): 139-43.  
39. Though Swinburne’s account as a whole might be considered a kind of hybrid between the 
creation and maximal excellence accounts. 
40. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 79. 
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of respect owed to God is of a peculiar kind, even if it shares certain features with the 
respect we owe to other benefactors. This unique sort of respect—worship—is the kind of 
respect to be given solely to our ultimate benefactor. Whatever respect we might owe to 
others on whom we depend, they depend equally on God for their existence. 
 Crowe offers reasons representative of what he calls a “redemption-based” 
account: “The basic thought is that, since God has performed acts of incalculable benefit 
for humanity, human beings are therefore obliged to render God His due as far as they are 
capable by worshipping Him.”41 Crowe lists the Christian belief in the incarnation of the 
second person of the Trinity and the atonement as acts that would ground an obligation to 
worship God. We are ultimately benefitted by these acts and worship is the only 
appropriate response as those indebted to a being who has rescued us from the 
misfortunes of the human condition.  
The creation and salvation-based accounts are subject to considerable criticisms. 
Concerning creation-based accounts, it is difficult to determine what precisely it means to 
say we are benefited by our having been created. Aside from certain controversial 
metaphysical theses—say, Aquinas’ view that being is goodness—it is not clear what 
sense it makes to compare the pros and cons of existence to that of nonexistence. There 
was no subject to attribute benefits or disadvantages to before our being created.42 
Granting, even, that it is sensible to say we are benefited by our having been created, it 
remains unclear whether the essence of worship is to respond to someone as to a 
                                                
41. Benjamin Crow, “Reasons for Worship: A Response to Bayne and Nagasawa,” Religious 
Studies 43 (2007): 470.  
42. This is a similar critique to that of Nagasawa and Bayne in “Grounds of Worship,” 305. 
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benefactor. This response seems more akin to attitudes such as gratitude or perhaps in the 
more dramatic cases, a kind of indebtedness. Unless worship is reducible to attitudes such 
as gratefulness, creation-based accounts fail to offer a sufficient explanation for worship-
worthiness. 
Salvation based accounts face the difficulty of explaining why worship would be 
an appropriate attitude to take towards a being prior to any saving act on our behalf. The 
fall of humankind is often characterized as a kind of failure to worship God rightly. If this 
is the case, then God’s worship-worthiness is logically prior to his having saved us.43 If 
there had never been a fallen human nature in need of saving, what then would be the 
basis of God’s worship-worthiness? Additionally, like creation-based accounts, it seems 
that the kinds of attitudes appropriate in response to God’s saving acts are more akin to 
love and gratitude. Unless love and gratitude adequately capture the essence of what it is 
to worship a being, salvation-based accounts fail in the same way creation-based 
accounts do. 
An objector might reasonably ask whether an account of worship-worthiness that 
consciously excludes any salvation-based elements renders the seemingly 
counterintuitive result that the acts of salvation are not praiseworthy, strictly speaking. 
The intuitive appeal of this objection notwithstanding, granting a kind of worship-
worthiness property to any of God’s saving actions results in what I take to be far more 
counterintuitive results—results that those who would pose the objection would equally 
want to deny. Here is one way to think about it. Christian theists generally take as a 
                                                




matter of revealed truth that God is maximally worship-worthy—that is, God is that being 
than which there could be no more worship-worthy. Either it is or is not the case that God 
is maximally worship-worthy just in virtue of our standing in a certain relation to him in 
terms of his own nature. If God’s actions are worship-worthy in any strong sense, this 
mean that in acting to save us God becomes more worship-worthy than he would have 
been if he had not. We would be required to say that God is not maximally worship-
worthy without acting to save us because there was, so to speak, still room to grow. But 
this is contrary to other commitments theists generally hold concerning God’s 
sovereignty and the creature-independent basis of God’s value. God does not increase in 
value in creating the world or in saving his creation because counterfactually, God would 
have to be less valuable if he had not, and this is unacceptable.44 I will address the 
creature-independent basis of God’s worship-worthiness in more detail later in this 
chapter. Suffice for the moment to say that any account that would characterize the basis 
of God’s worship-worthiness in terms of a kind of instrumental or value-for-us account is 
suspect. 
                                                
44. A similar case could be made against the creation-based accounts. In The Divine Attributes, 
Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz argue that “maximal greatness relates to an entity’s worthiness for 
worship and moral admiration” and that “God’s core attributes together entail that he is most worthy of 
worship and admiration.” They also argue, however, that “all other things being equal, an entity which 
intentionally creates good is greater than an entity which does not.” See Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, The 
Divine Attributes (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 18-20. It cannot be both that God’s core attributes make him 
most worthy of worship and that in creating God becomes greater than he would be if he did not create 
(unless creation amounts to a core attribute that would entail some kind of panentheism). 
However, in an attempt to do justice to the intuition that worshipping God because of the saving 
work in Christ or because he is our creator is a supremely fitting thing to do, perhaps we could characterize 
the worship-worthiness of these acts as reducible to or expressions of the essential divine attributes such as 
divine freedom, generosity, power, and knowledge. To worship God in virtue of his saving or creating acts, 
then, would be really to worship God because of these properties. Either way, I am content to characterize 
the kinds of fitting responses to God’s saving and creating work as gratitude, love, and obedience. 
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 The most promising of the existing accounts of worship-worthiness is the 
maximal excellence account. The promise of the maximal excellence accounts lies in, 
among other things, its avoidance of the issues common to the relational-based accounts 
like the creation and salvation-based accounts above. Robert Adams characterizes the 
maximal excellence account as the recognition “not just of God’s benefits to us, but of 
[God’s] supreme degree of intrinsic excellence.”45 The basic idea is that God possesses 
great-making properties such as knowledge, power, and goodness to the intrinsic maxima 
of their value and to worship just is to perform actions that express beliefs to the effect 
that God is supremely valuable. Worship-worthiness is a property that supervenes on the 
relation of our natures to God’s absolutely perfect nature. No value could be added to 
God’s nature by a relation to creatures.  
 The maximal excellence account is not without its own problems. Recall 
Nagasawa’s objection to this account from the introduction: 
Suppose that X is nearly omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, but not 
quite. Assume that X is omnipotent and omnibenevolent but only nearly 
omniscient insofar as there is one true proposition that it does not know: p. If the 
maximal excellence account is correct and the phrase ‘maximal degree of intrinsic 
excellence’ presupposes omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, then 
whether or not X knows p, however trivial that proposition is, determines whether 
or not X is worthy of worship. As soon as X comes to know p, X suddenly 
becomes worthy of worship, which seems absurd.46 
 
Ed Wierenga addresses this objection head on: 
I think this example is impossible and thus that it fails to establish an objection. It 
is impossible because it requires that there be a being S, a proposition p, and a 
world W, such that in W, p is true, S does not know p, and yet for every truth q 
other than p, S knows q. Thus, S would know propositions as, Anyone who fails to 
                                                
45. Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 14.  
46. Yujin Nagasawa, Maximal God, 104.  
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believe p is making a mistake, I don't believe p, I am making a mistake in failing 
to believe p, If only I would believe p then I would know all truths, I am capable 
of believing p, I have evidence in favor of p sufficient for knowledge, p seems 
clearly and evidently true to me, etc. This does not seem to me to be a possible 
situation. Another way of seeing this is to note that omniscience is not a property 
that anyone who is not omniscient can get close to having. In this respect, it is like 
the first infinite cardinal—there is no really large natural number that is close to 
it. I do not think that appealing to an impossibility can refute a philosophical 
thesis (unless it is a thesis about what is possible). An exception to a claim about 
how things must be is a possible way that they could be otherwise—not a way 
that could not be that is otherwise.47 
My concern with responses such as Wierenga’s is that perhaps it amounts to more of a 
fixation on the particular example rather than the general point Nagasawa is making. 
Nagasawa’s objection raises an important question about the maximal excellence account 
of worship-worthiness in particular but functions as an important question for worship-
worthiness generally. It is a question already hinted at above: Is worship-worthiness a 
bivalent property? That is, is worship-worthiness all-or-nothing—either a worship-
worthy being is absolutely perfect or not worship-worthy at all? 
The heart of Nagasawa’s objection seems to be that we can conceive of a being so 
impressive as to land just one tier down on the scale of greatness from absolute perfection 
and that this being may even be God. Suppose absolute perfection entails the co-
instantiation of omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence. Suppose also that 
absolute perfection turns out to be impossible. If God is the greatest possible being, and 
the greatest possible being is a being who falls just short of absolute perfection, what 
reason is there to believe worship would be an inappropriate attitude to take towards this 
being? Nagasawa would say we have no more reason to believe that this being’s inability 
                                                
47. Ed Wierenga, “Augustinian Perfect Being Theology and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2001): 149. 
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to instantiate an impossible set of properties is a disparagement on the value of this being 
than it would be a disparagement on the value of God’s power to say God cannot create 
logical impossibilities such as square triangles. In this scenario, God is still supremely 
valuable (in the sense that he actualizes the most possible value) even if he isn’t 
absolutely perfect.  
The sentiment behind the maximal excellence account includes claims such as 
Brian Leftow’s: “arguably to see God as anything less than absolutely perfect would 
make Him out not to deserve the sorts of attitudes Western monotheist worship 
involves.”48 The justification for claims such as these usually goes something like this:  
What deserves only qualified or limited praise thus does not deserve worship. 
And anything that can have a superior can deserve only qualified or limited 
praise. It is great—but there can be a greater, and so its praise ought to be 
qualified accordingly. ‘O god, you are great—but there can be greater’: this does 
not sound like worship.49  
 
Murphy entertains the same thought: “It may well be that complete worship cannot be 
given to a being conceived as less than perfect—how can one worship God as fully as 
possible while thinking ‘but you could have been better’ or ‘there could have been a 
being greater than you?’”50 The problem with this on Nagasawa’s view is that in the 
scenario above there could not have been a greater. If absolute perfection is impossible, it 
would not be the case that there could have been a better and thus the “there could have 
been a better” line of reasoning fails as a justification for the maximal excellence 
account. 
                                                
48. Leftow, God and Necessity, 11.  
49. Leftow, Ontological Argument, 93-94. 
50. Murphy God’s Own Ethics, 3. 
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 This is not to say the maximal excellence account ultimately fails. On the 
sufficient value inequality condition, it may be that the level of greatness necessary for 
worship-worthiness just is absolute perfection. But for any being who falls short of 
absolute perfection, the justified withholding of worship of this being would be in virtue 
of its failing to have satisfied the sufficient value inequality condition, not because “there 
could have been a better.” Accordingly, in a world where the maximal excellence account 
of worship-worthiness is true and an absolutely perfect being is not possibly instantiated, 
there simply would be no worship-worthy being. Even so, it remains unanswered why 
absolute perfection is the requisite amount of greatness necessary for worship-worthiness.  
It may well be the case in the end that worship-worthiness requires absolute 
perfection. Perhaps there are other ways to get around objections of the type levied by 
Nagasawa than to concede the multivalence of worship-worthiness—that is, to admit that 
worship-worthiness is not an all-or-nothing property. I do not see how this could be done, 
however, without the appeal to rather controversial metaphysical theses and thicker 
concepts of God or certain kinds of defenses of perfect being theism than are often 
commonly in circulation. Rather than making such a move, I will attempt to 
accommodate objections to the maximal excellence account or worship-worthiness such 
as Nagasawa’s by proceeding with my own account of worship-worthiness on their 
terms—that is, on metaphysically deflationary grounds. 
The Dual Threshold Account of Worship-Worthiness 
 The dual-threshold account of worship-worthiness I intend to defend shares most 
in common with the maximal excellence account in that it grounds worship-worthiness in 
the creature-independent value of any potential object of worship rather than the value-
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for-us creation and salvation-based accounts. The maximal excellence account posits a 
single threshold for worship-worthiness—absolute perfection. However, in an attempt to 
accommodate objections of the type levied by Nagasawa, for the sake of argument, I will 
be positing a minimum threshold for worship-worthiness short of absolute perfection. 
This means I will be proceeding on the assumption that worship-worthiness does not 
require absolute perfection. 
 As noted above, I take worship to be fundamentally about the appropriate 
response to a certain kind of value. For the sake of this project, it will be useful to assume 
certain things about what kinds of attributes would make a being valuable. Atheists and 
theists alike generally agree about what those traits are. Along these lines, I will not be 
defending here that a great amount of power is a valuable attribute, contrary to what 
certain schools like process theism might say or that great knowledge is valuable in the 
way theists traditionally construe knowledge contrary to what open theists might say or 
pragmatists about knowledge for knowledge’s sake. I shall take as axiomatic, then, that 
the value of traits such knowledge, power, and goodness can be thought of as existing on 
a kind of scale of value reaching to their intrinsic maxima—that is, omniscience, 
omnipotence, and omnibenevolence represent the most valuable instance of each property 
and certain beings possess varying combinations of knowledge, power, and goodness to 
varying degrees.51  
                                                
51. I am laying aside here, also, the complex issues surrounding the question of whether these 
properties are predicated univocally, analogically, or equivocally of worship-worthy and non worship-
worthy beings, or whether a being exhibiting these traits to the maximal degree could really properly be 
considered an “instance” of anything.  
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Worship-worthiness is a property that supervenes on the relation of two parties 
massively unequal in value. Call this the sufficient value inequality condition. I take this 
to be the key consideration for worship-worthiness. This consideration is made up of two 
key components. First, as has been mentioned already, worship is never appropriately 
reflexive. If worship presupposes a kind of elevation of the object and the minimization 
of the subject, one can never appropriately worship oneself. Accordingly, this 
supervenience entails necessarily the relation between two parties. Second, worship-
worthiness entails necessarily an essential superiority of one being over the other.52 This 
superiority, again, is about a certain kind of inevitable and all-consuming difference in 
value such that it reduces the worshipper “to comparative nothingness.”53 The minimum 
threshold requisite for worship-worthiness, then, is met when the sufficient value 
inequality condition is satisfied. 
This value is intrinsic to the object of worship rather than a kind of instrumental 
value, that is, a value-for-us. The inequality between a given being and any given 
worship-worthy being X must be so vast that for any X, it cannot be the case that value is 
added to X should X act in certain ways that are beneficial to creatures as insignificant as 
worshippers of X. This is because, counterfactually, if X had not acted in certain ways 
beneficial to worshippers of X, X would be less valuable than if X had acted in those 
ways. This would mean that creatures of relative insignificance or nothingness would 
                                                
52. I am taking as a jumping off point Mark Murphy’s helpful section on worship-worthiness in 
God’s Own Ethics. Here, Murphy briefly reflects on these two components as “key to circumscribing 
appropriate worship-worthiness relations.” See 129-34.  
53. Findlay, “Can God’s Existence be Disproved,” 51. 
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have a real bearing on the value of beings of absurd magnitude. But this is contrary to 
their value.54  
It is a basic feature of worship-worthiness, then, that the worship-worthiness of a 
being depends asymmetrically on the value of that being. This means that the value of a 
being is more explanatorily basic that whatever other features this being might have.55  
As I see it, there are two potential problems that arise from a formulation of a 
minimum threshold of worship-worthiness where this threshold is not absolute 
perfection. The first problem is that it seems Nagasawa’s objection could be repurposed 
as an objection to the minimum threshold when the minimum threshold is an attempt to 
accommodate Nagasawa’s objection in the first place.56 Let’s say that the minimum 
threshold requisite for worship-worthiness with respect to rational creatures has a 
determinate content made up of a specific configuration of knowledge, power, and 
goodness. Would it not still be the case that a given being would go from not worship-
worthy to worship-worthy with one uptick in value where the relative difference in value 
between these beings appears to be too trivial to justify the evaluative difference? 
Worship is elusive enough as a concept that it should come as no surprise that an 
account of worship-worthiness might run up against issues with borderlines cases. We 
may not be able to know whether a man becomes bald at 400 rather than 500 hairs. But 
                                                
54. This is a common attitude in the major monotheisms. That a being of such great value as a 
being like God would take any stock in the well-being of creatures is considered by the psalmist to be 
marvelous: “When I look at your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars that you have 
established; what are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them?” (Ps. 8:3-
4 NRSV).  
55. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 3 
56. I am grateful to Mark Murphy for pointing this out to me. 
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the vagueness problem for worship-worthiness is its relative borderline cases, meaning, 
“the question is clear but our means for answering it are incomplete.” Absolute borderline 
cases, on the other hand—cases where “there is incompleteness in the question itself” or 
an intrinsic uncertainty—are not the issue here as they are in the case of whether cutting 
off the head of a two-headed man counts as an instance of decapitating him.57 No amount 
of conceptual analysis will answer this question for us without somewhat arbitrary 
stipulations about the definition of decapitation. This is not so with worship-worthiness. 
And as with other cases of vagueness in relative borderline cases, the problem is not with 
the predicate itself but in our thinking about the predicate.  
Wierenga’s reply to Nagasawa may be of more use here than in its original 
context. Nagasawa’s “one trivial proposition” example appears to presume worship-
worthiness moves at minute intervals. If this were the case, then worship-worthiness 
borderline cases would be as seemingly impossible to resolve as the case of baldness. If it 
were the case that baldness exclusively describes a subject when he reaches n number of 
hairs then it would have to be true that at n + 1 hair this subject is no longer bald. But the 
interval of a single hair seems far too small for this to be true. Worship-worthiness is a 
very different kind of predicate than baldness. It may be the case that there is no regular 
interval set on the scale of worship-worthiness. It may be the case that the intervals are 
regular but incredibly far apart. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the value interval at 
the minimum threshold is large enough to justify the evaluative difference between 
                                                
57. Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018) ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vagueness/>. 
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worship-worthy and not worship-worthy.58 By my lights, this is sufficient to show the 
relative plausibility of a  hard threshold even if the vagueness as to where exactly the 
actual threshold lands is left unresolved or is unresolvable. 
The usefulness of a minimum threshold short of absolute perfection, even if we 
must use “threshold” less strongly in the minimum case because of the vagueness of its 
borderline cases, is that it creates some distance between these borderline issues and 
instances of worship-worthiness closer to the maximum end of the spectrum than the 
minimum. It is important to keep in mind here the goals of this project as a whole. What I 
am after in the end is an explanation of worship-worthiness in the case of absolute 
perfection. The issue of vagueness at the minimum level of worship-worthiness is no 
more a problem for maximal worship-worthiness than borderline cases of baldness is a 
problem for the legitimacy of predicating baldness of a man with zero hairs on his head.  
The second potential issue that arises with a defense of a minimum threshold of 
worship-worthiness short of absolute perfection is whether this introduces a flexibility 
into the concept itself that amounts to a kind of indeterminism. If the key consideration 
has to do with the value differential condition, then it appears that the minimum threshold 
requisite for worship-worthiness might be variable (conceptually) on the kinds of 
creatures that exist in the world. For example, is it a consequence of a defense of this sort 
that there is a possible world where humans turned out to be worship-worthy beings? If 
there existed beings sufficiently inferior to humans, it might be the case that these beings 
                                                
58. This type of move would not work in the original context of Wierenga’s reply to Nagasawa 
because even if the interval just before absolute perfection were large, we would still be talking about a 
being of incredible greatness. But in the case of one downtick from the minimum threshold, we may be 
talking about a being sufficiently inferior as to fail to be worship-worthy.  
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could appropriately worship them. Additionally, if this follows, it would have the absurd 
consequence of the possibility of human beings being worship-worthy in a world where 
beings like God exist. In this case, both human beings and God are worship-worthy and 
the minimum threshold appears to be stretched so thin in terms of its actual content as to 
be meaningless.  
This objection can be resolved relatively easily. Any worship-worthiness relation 
necessarily presupposes a subject capable of forming the relevant beliefs, attitudes, and 
desires constitutive of worship. But to be capable of forming these beliefs, attitudes, and 
desires this subject must possess at the least an intellect and a will. It is hard to envision, 
then, a being who both possesses an intellect and a will and is sufficiently inferior in 
value to human beings as to satisfy the value differential condition. This rules out 
inanimate objects, plants, non-rational animals, and a whole host of other kinds of 
objects. What this means is that whatever the range of possible minimum thresholds, each 
will fall within the same relatively narrow range of value insofar as 1) in all possible 
worlds creatures such as humans generally hold the lowest position of value while still 
having the capacities requisite for worship and 2) there is a ceiling on worship-worthiness 
in the case of absolute perfection—that is, worship-worthiness has an intrinsic maximum. 
So, it is not the case on my defense of the minimum threshold that there is a possible 
world where both human beings and God are worship-worthy.59 
                                                
59. The more difficult kinds of questions relevant to the flexibility of the minimum threshold are 
questions such as, “Could God create a creature so impressive as to fail to satisfy the value inequality 
condition—that is, are there possible beings so great that God would not be worthy of their worship?” 




The minimum threshold, then, is the minimum distance in value between the 
subject and the object of worship requisite for worship-worthiness. This distance is of an 
absurd magnitude such that the worshipper is reduced to comparative nothingness. I have 
argued that this—the sufficient value inequality condition—is the key consideration for 
getting our heads around worship-worthiness. Having argued for an account of worship-
worthiness along these lines, we have set something of a base from which we can ascend 








An important aim of the last chapter was to tease apart the concept of worship-
worthiness from the concept of God to clarify what the concept might mean apart from its 
association with the concept of God. In doing so, I am not necessarily committing myself 
to the view that the concept of God and worship-worthiness are not mutually entailing. I 
argued that the sufficient value inequality condition is the key consideration for getting 
our heads around worship-worthiness. The minimum threshold of worship-worthiness is 
met when the sufficient value inequality condition is satisfied. Making the case for the 
minimum threshold of worship-worthiness required showing why it is problematic to take 
worship-worthiness as a sufficient value criterion for perfect being theology.  
 Now we are in a position to move on to the task of the current chapter: to explore 
what might make up the unique character of worship-worthiness in the supreme case—
that is, in the case of a being like God. To that end, over the course of this chapter, I will 
identify and defend what I take to be two main features of an account of supreme 
worship-worthiness: 1) the supremely worship-worthy being cannot fail to satisfy the 
value inequality condition with respect to any being other than itself capable of forming 
the relevant beliefs, attitudes, and desires constitutive of worship and 2) the supremely 
worship-worthy being is worthy of an undivided worship.  
 I mentioned in the last chapter that I will be making certain assumptions about 
what traits are valuable for a being to have. There are standard and nonstandard ways of 
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conceiving of what traits are valuable and thus what traits an absolutely perfect being 
would possess. For my purposes, I shall default to the standard way of conceiving of 
absolute perfection. There are two things to note about the standard account of absolute 
perfection functioning in my account of supreme worship-worthiness. First, I am working 
with a relatively thin concept of absolute perfection so as to not kick any one off the team 
from the get-go. Some would say that rather controversial attributes such simplicity (or 
noncomposition) would be included in a being who is absolutely perfect.1 For the 
moment, I will take absolute perfection to refer to a representative set of attributes as 
something of a common denominator: omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence. 
Second, absolute perfection in the standard sense entails an intrinsic maximum of value. 
To say there is an intrinsic maximum to the value a being might exhibit is simply to say it 
is not the case that the value of a being could increase indefinitely in the same way the set 
of natural numbers increases indefinitely.2 However traits such as omniscience, 
omnibenevolence, and omnipotence may be construed in their more technical definitions, 
the intrinsic maxima of each means that it could not be the case that any one of these 
                                                
1. I am also using the qualifier “absolute” in order to distinguish the working concept here from 
revisionist accounts of perfection such as Nagasawa’s, where “perfect being” may refer to a set of attributes 
that does not include the relevant omni attributes. 
2. For instance, “what is essential in connection with divine might,” says George Schlesinger, “is 
not its infinite magnitude nor its being equal to any task whatever, but that it exists in the sufficient amount 
required for divine perfection. Thus if we should discover various tasks that seem to be beyond the scope of 
His power, that is not necessarily any consequence as long as it is evident that the ability to perform the 
tasks in question is not the kind of ability that enhances the greatness of the individual having it.” To put 
the intrinsic maximum of omnipotence formally, then “X is omnipotent if it is logically impossible to 
increase X’s power in consequence of which X might gain in excellence.” See George Schlesinger, “Divine 




attributes be realized in a more valuable way. Conceptually, absolute perfection 
represents the upper limit of value.  
Necessary Worship-Worthiness 
 This last feature of the standard account of perfection I am working with bears a 
relevant and parallel consequence for supreme worship-worthiness. If absolute perfection 
is the upper limit of value, and worship-worthiness is a property that increases 
proportionately with the value of a being to the intrinsic maximum of value, then 
worship-worthiness too has an intrinsic maximum. Call this supreme worship-worthiness. 
To be supremely worship-worthy means occupying the highest position on the scale of 
worship-worthiness.  
 There are two ways to think about supreme worship-worthiness and its normative 
status. Supreme worship-worthiness could be understood in a stronger normative sense or 
a weaker descriptive sense. The weaker sense simply identifies absolute perfection as the 
upper limit of worship-worthiness. It may be the case on the weaker notion that the 
supremely worship-worthy being, as absolutely perfect, would be worthy of the worship 
of any being such as humans but perhaps not the being who occupies the position of 
value one downtick from absolute perfection.  
The normative sense is a much more expansive concept. For example, Mark 
Murphy’s definition of supreme worship-worthiness highlights the expansive nature of 
the normative notion: “x has achieved this upper limit of worship-worthiness if 
necessarily, if y is an agent (or an agent capable of forming the beliefs, attitudes, etc. 
relevant to worship) and x ≠  y, then x is worthy of y’s worship.”3 The expansive nature 
                                                
3. Mark Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 130. There are a number of things that might follow from 
this more expansive definition about what kinds of properties a being would need to have in order to 
 
 51 
of this way of putting it can be illustrated with a question such as this: Could there exist a 
being so impressive so as to fail to satisfy the value inequality condition with respect to 
the supremely worship-worthy being? Or consider again Nagasawa’s objection to the 
maximal excellence account. On the value differential condition, could a being one 
downtick in value from absolute perfection appropriately worship the supremely worship-
worthy being? On the stronger normative notion, it must be the case that any being who 
is not the supremely worship-worthy being, however impressive or absurdly valuable, 
could appropriately worship the supremely worship-worthy being and so satisfy the value 
inequality condition. Murphy’s sense of supreme worship-worthiness, then, presses 
outward on the boundaries of value—or, as Murphy puts it in terms of the Anselmian 
being’s perfection: “in characterizing the perfections of the Anselmian being, we should 
conceive them as ‘pressing outward.’ That is, there is rational pressure towards 
characterizing the Anselmian perfections in a substantively more expansive way.”4 In an 
analogous way, there is rational pressure, on Murphy’s conception of supreme worship-
worthiness, towards characterizing the value of the supremely worship-worthy being as 
pressing outward against the upper limits of value so that for any being who is not the 
supremely worship-worthy being capable of worshipping, to worship the supremely 
worship-worthy being would be a fitting thing to do. 
                                                
guarantee the requisite value gap between the supremely worship-worthy being and any other being such 
that the supremely worship-worthy being would necessarily be worthy of their worship. For the purposes of 
this project, I will be restricting my reflections to the two I have identified in the introduction until later in 
the project when I reflect on the relevance of thicker concepts of God and thicker metaphysical 
commitments for an account of worship-worthiness.  
4. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 21.  
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It might be that the weaker and stronger senses of supreme worship-worthiness 
are not as far apart as I have indicated. Perhaps the first notion does have the expansive 
power of the stronger notion built into it, but we simply are missing a step. We need a 
reason to think that supreme worship-worthiness entails the necessary worship-
worthiness of all other beings capable of forming the beliefs, desires, and attitudes 
constitutive of worship. It seems to me the guiding intuition for an account of supreme 
worship-worthiness is the notion that to be supremely worship-worthy means to be more 
worship-worthy than any other potentially worship-worthy being. “Supreme” is a greater-
than relation. So, the supremely worship-worthy being, to be supreme, must possess the 
attributes that make it more worship-worthy than any other worship-worthy being. Thus 
the key consideration for an account of supreme worship-worthiness is to identify what 
traits would make a being more worthy of worship than another.  
This brings us to the first main feature of supreme worship-worthiness: the 
supremely worship-worthy being cannot fail to satisfy the value inequality condition with 
respect to any being other than itself capable of forming the relevant beliefs, attitudes, 
and desires constitutive of worship. It seems apparent that to be worthy of any rational 
agent’s worship is to be more worship-worthy than to be worthy of the worship of only a 
limited range of worshippers. Here is one way to think about it. We can think of worship-
worthiness admitting of varying degrees of stability or reliability. For any worship-
worthy being just above the minimum threshold of worship-worthiness with respect to 
creatures such humans (or whatever rational creature occupies the lowest status while still 
possessing the requisite capacities for worship), we can imagine a host of changes to the 
world in which they exist where they would lose their worship-worthy status with respect 
 
 53 
to some beings. Say a being just minimally qualifies as a worship-worthy being in a 
world where Superman will be born. Suppose also that before Superman’s birth the only 
other rational agents in this world are humans and this minimally worship-worthy being.5 
On Superman’s birth, a being substantially more impressive than human beings has come 
to exist and this minimally worship-worthy being loses its universal worship-worthy 
status. As this example illustrates, beings who exist in the lowest register of worship-
worthiness have a maximally fragile worship-worthiness status insofar as these beings are 
the most susceptible to losing that status with respect to the largest range of kinds of 
beings.6   
To be supremely worship-worthy, on the other hand, is to have a maximally stable 
worship-worthiness status. This maximally stable worship-worthiness status is another 
way of putting the supremely worship-worthy being’s necessary worship-worthiness of 
all rational agents capable of worshipping. For any being x who is not the supremely 
worship-worthy being, even the most valuable being second to the supremely worship-
worthy being, the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of x’s worship. There is no 
change to any possible world that could result in the supremely worship-worthy being 
losing its worship-worthiness status with respect to any beings with the requisite 
capacities for worship.7 
                                                
5. I realize this example is doing a terrible injustice to the cosmology of the DC universe.  
6. This line of thinking is an adaptation of Jonathan Kvanvig’s articulation of God’s necessary 
existence. See “Anselmian Adversities,” Religious Studies (2018): 4.  
7. One (not insignificant) matter that has not been addressed up to this point is whether there could 
be more than one perfect being and the possible problems this would create for any account of supreme 
worship-worthiness. If there are two absolutely perfect beings and “supreme” is a greater-than relation, it 
seems as though there would be no supremely worship-worthy being in a world with two absolutely perfect 
beings. I am not convinced that there is a possible world where more than one absolutely perfect being 
exists. Rather than dedicate space to rehearsing some of the standard ways of addressing this question in 
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The objector might say that this reintroduces the problem of flexibility in the 
concept of a minimum threshold verging on the kind of indeterminacy that was addressed 
in the last chapter. If the supremely worship-worthy being is necessarily worship-worthy, 
then this would mean that being would be worthy of the worship even of other worship-
worthy beings. But for the supremely worship-worthy being to be worthy of the worship 
of other worship-worthy beings, that being must satisfy the sufficient value inequality 
condition with respect to these other worship-worthy beings. This would mean there is an 
absurd difference in value between any other worship-worthy being and the supremely 
worship-worthy being. The minimum threshold for worship-worthiness, then, would 
stretch the absurd range of value from minimally worship-worthy beings to the supremely 
worship-worthy being. So while the account I have been defending up to this point does 
not allow for the possibility that creatures like humans and beings like God are worship-
worthy, does it leave open a wide enough range of value as to lose its determinate 
content? 
There are two ways to think about the bearing on the range of value of existing 
beings in a world where a supremely worship-worthy being exists. One would be that the 
existence of beings who qualify as worship-worthy who are not the supremely worship-
worthy being presses ever outward on the value of the supremely worship-worthy being. 
The direction of conceptual influence, then, flows from non-supremely worship-worthy 
worship-worthy beings towards the supremely worship-worthy being such that for any 
worship-worthy being, the supremely-worship worthy being is always sufficiently more 
                                                
perfect being theology, I will simply take for granted as a standard account of absolute perfection that there 
can in principle only be one absolutely perfect being.  
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valuable so as to necessarily qualify as worthy even of their worship. The problem with 
thinking of the bearing on the value of existing beings in a world where there is a 
supremely worship-worthy being is that there is only so much space (so to speak) to 
move upwards in value. Worship-worthiness has an intrinsic maximum; thus it cannot be 
the case that the threshold of value requisite for supreme worship-worthiness can be 
pressed ever outward without qualification—the pressure outward can only go so far. 
The second way to think of this relation is that the existence of a supremely 
worship-worthy being places a conceptual restraint on the range of the possible value of 
other rational creatures. The direction of conceptual influence then, flows from the 
supremely worship-worthy being downward such that the range of value of beings 
possessing the requisite capacities for worship are significantly lower than had a 
supremely worship-worthy being not existed. Putting things this way does not necessarily 
undermine the validity of the minimum threshold as a real concept; it only means that if it 
is possible for the supremely worship-worthy being to exist, it may be the case that there 
are no other beings who would qualify as worship-worthy. In a world where there is no 
supremely worship-worthy being, the minimum threshold is still a viable concept.8  
Singleness of Object 
 This more expansive understanding of what it might mean to be the most 
worship-worthy being on the scale of worship-worthiness, in addition to delivering 
necessary worship-worthiness, brings us to the second principal feature of supreme 
                                                
8. There could be a number of ways to go about guaranteeing the requisite value gap for necessary 
worship-worthiness. Perhaps it is in virtue of a being like the supremely worship-worthy being being the 
only being who is uncreated. Perhaps it is in virtue of a participation model of value where the supremely 
worship-worthy being is the only being whose value is not derived from something other than itself. 
Perhaps it is in virtue of the supremely worship-worthy being being the only noncomposite being.  
 
 56 
worship-worthiness: the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of an undivided 
worship. The question here, as in the case of necessary worship-worthiness, is to ask 
what properties would make a being worthier of worship than any other being. The 
guiding intuition for singleness of object is that it is more worship-worthy to be the sole 
worship-worthy being than to be a worship-worthy being among other worship-worthy 
beings. The supremely worship-worthy being, then, would be required to possess this 
feature. Call this the principle of undivided worship.  
In this section, I will attempt to provide a somewhat modest explanation of the 
principle of undivided worship. As a general note, one initially tempting but ultimately 
inadvisable way to go about achieving the entailment from supreme worship-worthiness 
to singleness of object is to characterize this principle in terms of creaturely limitation. 
For example, one way to make good on the intuition that to be the only worship-worthy 
being is to be more worship-worthy than to be a worship-worthy being among other 
worship-worthy beings might be to appeal to the notion of competition. Beings of 
incredible value may stand in competition with one another in some sense insofar as a 
person is unable to worship more than one being at one time. But this fact of the limited 
nature of a person’s intentional capacities says more about creaturely limitation than it 
does the value of other beings. The finite capacities of a creature would not nullify the 
incredible value and thus the worship-worthiness of another being. 
Instead, a more promising way to go about getting the entailment would be to 
work within the concept of worship itself. The general idea is that, perhaps if we can get 
specific enough about what is happening when someone is worshipping, we can dial up a 
specific feature of worship to the supreme level and achieve singleness of object. This 
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approach suggests something of a direct relationship between the strength of the reasons 
for worship and the worshipfulness of the actions called for. The greater the reasons for 
worship, the stronger and more expansive the justifying force there is behind any given 
worshipful action. The range of worshipful actions justified in worshipping the supremely 
worship-worthy being is more inclusive than the range of worshipful actions justified in 
worshipping some minimally worship-worthy being. Here is a rough analogy. The kinds 
of acts performed with the intent to express love for another person should be 
proportionate to the strength of the reasons one has to love that person. That a person is 
related to us in a unique way would be such a reason. The kinds of actions one might 
perform to express love for one’s child will be much more loving (thoughtful, sacrificial, 
selfless) than the kinds of actions one might perform in expressing love for the child of an 
acquaintance. Similarly, the stronger the reasons for worship or the more worship-worthy 
a being is (the more knowledgeable, powerful, good—the more valuable the being) the 
more worshipful (glorifying of the object, self-abasing) the actions justified in expressing 
the beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions constitutive of worship. 
The feature of worship that I will attempt to show can be used to get the 
entailment is attention. Effectively, turning the worship-attention dial up to the maximum 
looks like a singular and unbroken attention. By singular, I mean that the kind of 
attention constitutive of an act of worship directed towards the supremely worship-
worthy being at any one time ought to crowd out other objects as objects of worship. By 
unbroken, I mean the supremely worship-worthy being would be worthy of the attention 
constitutive of an act of worship at every opportunity where worshipping is a reasonable 
 
 58 
thing to do. These two components together, singular and continuous attention, are what 
amount to singleness of object. I will defend these two components in turn.  
There is a further clarification to make before getting to the two main components 
of the principle of undivided worship. There are three possible ways that the principle of 
undivided praise might be understood.  
Strong: If one adequately worships the supremely worship-worthy being, one will 
worship the supremely worship-worthy being exclusively.  
Stronger: The existence of the supremely worship-worthy being amounts to a 
requiring reason not to worship other beings.  
Strongest: The existence of a supremely worship-worthy being places a 
metaphysical constraint on the value of other creatures such that its existence 
excludes the possibility that other worship-worthy beings exist.  
 
Because I have decided to restrict my reflections to justifying rather than requiring 
reasons for worship and to forgo what I think to be the relevant metaphysical and 
theological commitments that would be needed to make the strongest case, I will restrict 
my reflections to a defense of the strong formulation of the principle of undivided 
worship. Along these lines, by “adequately worships” I mean, loosely, if one adequately 
worships the supremely worship-worthy being, one will 1) worship in a way that 
meaningfully corresponds to what the supremely worship-worthy being’s greatness 
would merit for that being and 2) is in accord with their capacities. 
Singular Attention 
 An early reflection on the nature of attention comes from William James: 
Attention “is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of 
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, 
concentration, of consciousness are of its essence.”9 Since James, many others have 
                                                
9. William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (Boston: Henry Holt and Co., 1890), 403. 
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reflected on the nature of attention in psychology, neuro and behavioral science, 
phenomenology, and philosophy of mind. As a result, there are a number of ways 
attention has been conceptualized. Wayne Wu notes four in particular:  
• Attention as a filter of information for further processing 
• Attention as binding features for object representation and awareness 
• Attention as spotlight (perhaps zoom-lens), highlighting its target 
• Attention as selecting targets for memory consciousness, or action10 
 
Wu himself defends an account of attention as “the subject’s selecting an item for the 
purpose of guiding action”11 Sebastian Watzl argues for a structural account of attention 
where “the contents of conscious experience can be represented in a space defined by 
relations of relative salience. Attention to an item structures one’s conscious experience 
around that item.”12 Each of these have in common the basic notion identified by James: 
“Attention is involved in the selective directedness of our mental lives.”13 
 I do not plan to devote space to analyzing the concept beyond this basic notion. 
For the purposes of this project, I will take this notion of the selectivity of attention as 
basic to any account of attention. With the exception of addressing issues relevant to an 
account of attention as they arise in my defense of the principle of undivided worship, the 
“selective directedness of our mental lives” will be sufficient as a working concept of 
attention to get the discussion off the ground.  
                                                
10. Wayne Wu, Attention (New York: Routledge, 2014), 5.  
11. Wu, Attention, 6.  
12. Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies, and Wayne Wu, “Introduction,” in Attention: 
Philosophical and Psychological Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), xv; Sebastian Watzl 
“Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness” in Attention: Philosophical and Psychological 
Essays. 
13. Christopher Mole, “Attention,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017) edited by 
Edward N. Zalta URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/attention/>. 
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 Accordingly, we can turn now to an explanation and defense of the first 
component of the principle of undivided worship: singular attention. There is 
disagreement in the literature on attention as to whether attention is something that can be 
divided—that is, if there is such a thing as partial attention or whether attention admits of 
degrees. The alternative is that attention is a kind of cognitive unison.14 On the notion of 
attention as cognitive unison, distraction would amount to something like the shifting of 
attention between multiple targets. I do not think that my defense of singular attention in 
the case of supreme worship-worthiness hangs on either one of these options.  
 Here is a defense of singular attention in the case of supreme worship-worthiness 
under the assumption that attention can be partial. There is something intuitionally 
compelling about the idea of attention admitting of degrees. We commonly speak as 
though we give more attention to matters that are of more consequence or significance or 
value than matters of relative insignificance. It would sound somewhat odd to say that a 
brain surgeon devotes the same amount of attention to his drive to work as he does when 
performing brain surgery. A high profile spy may find herself out to dinner with an 
unsuspecting partner whom she devotes just enough attention to so as not to give away 
that the real reason she is there is to listen to the conversation of the two men sitting 
directly behind her where the majority of her attention is directed.  
 Accordingly, if we were to isolate a single act of worship at a particular moment 
in time, the attention directed to the object of worship would exist somewhere on the 
scale from minimal attention to maximal attention. But if the amount of attention that we 
                                                
14. Wu, Attention, 99-103; Christopher Mole, Attention Is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in 
Philosophical Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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give to an object tends to reflect the value or relative significance of that object, then it 
makes sense to say that the degree of attention a worship-worthy being would be worthy 
of increases proportionately with that being’s worship-worthiness.  
 Along these lines, the kind of selective directedness of our mental lives involved 
in an act of worship—carrying with it the cognitive and volitional content constitutive of 
worship15—can be more or less pure or unified. In the case of a minimally worship-
worthy being, it would not necessarily be unfitting if our attention was split between this 
worship-worthy being and something else—even another worship-worthy being. It may 
even be inappropriate to give our absolute or unified attention to a minimally worship-
worthy being. It would be inappropriate to give the amount of attention to a baseball 
game that the birth of one’s child would merit and vice versa. The birth of one’s child 
would be worthy of an absolute attention while a baseball game would not.  
 The supremely worship-worthy being, however, would be worthy of our singular 
attention in any one act of worship. The kind of attention constitutive of an act of worship 
directed towards the supremely worship-worthy being at any one time ought to crowd out 
other objects as objects of worship. I use emphasis here to indicate that I do not mean 
singular attention in the sense that any act of worship of the supremely worship-worthy 
being ought to crowd out any other object from the perceptual field or awareness of the 
subject. For example, in Christian worship, a person may kneel before the consecrated 
host with her attention directed singularly toward the host. But this does not mean that the 
worshipper does not also see the altar, hear the deacon, smell the incense, and have some 
                                                
15. To direct our attention in worship to a worship-worthy being would be in some sense to call to 
mind the reasons for worship—whether beliefs or attitudes.  
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level of awareness of these objects. Rather, the attention at this particular moment in time 
is of a kind that eliminates all other objects as potential objects of worship.  
 But what if it is not possible, as some theorists of attention think, for attention to 
be divided? The notion of attention as cognitive unison is a form of the selection for 
action account of attention. Christopher Mole states it formally:  
Let α be an agent, let τ be some task that the agent is performing, and call the set 
of cognitive resources that α can, with understanding, bring to bear in the service 
of τ, τ’s “background set.”  
α’s performance of τ displays cognitive unison if and only if the resources in τ’s 
background set are not occupied with activity that does not serve τ.16  
 
The basic idea is that to attend to something is to dedicate every relevant cognitive 
function to guiding some action; or at least, if a function is not involved in the guiding of 
a task, it is not involved in the aiding of some other task. Distraction, on this account, 
would be characterized as the shifting of attention between targets rather than attention 
being split between multiple targets.  
 Consequently, we need only to make a minor adjustment to the defense of 
singular attention offered above. On this account of attention, the singular attention 
merited by the supremely worship-worthy being would be for a cognitive unison to be 
sustained over the period of a single worship event. Rather than grounding this claim in 
the notion that we tend to devote more attention to matters of more significance (as 
“more” implies that attention can be partial), we can think of sustained attention over any 
period of time as something that requires more or less energy to sustain. The amount of 
energy we allocate to remaining undistracted during a movie is likely less than the 
amount we allocate to remaining undistracted during an important exam. Thus we can 
                                                
16. Christopher Mole, Attention is Cognitive Unison, 64.  
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think of the energy we devote to sustaining our attention on any one target of worship as 
existing on a scale where minimally worship-worthy beings are worthy of less energy 
dedicated to sustaining attention during worship than the supremely worship-worthy 
being. The supremely worship-worthy being, then, would be worthy of a sustained 
attention minimally susceptible to being broken. This explicitly eliminates all other 
objects as potential objects of worship over any one episode. Perhaps it would be 
appropriate to shift our attention as we offer sacrifices to Jupiter and then to Juno in one 
cultic event, but this would not be the case for the supremely worship-worthy being.  
Continuous Attention 
 Suppose the singular attention criterion succeeds; is this sufficient to deliver 
undivided worship? Even if the supremely worship-worthy being were worthy of an 
undivided attention over the course of any one worship event, the episodic nature of 
worship complicates the case for undivided worship. Generally, a person worships for a 
period and then is done worshipping. What might it mean, then, to say that the supremely 
worship-worthy being would be worthy of a singular attention unbroken over time—that 
is, over the lifetime of a worshiper? 
One way to understand the element of continuous worship would be to expand the 
kinds of actions that could be considered acts of worship beyond the typical ones such 
that each one of our actions is a candidate for an act of worship. Thinking of it this way 
would characterize the supremely worship-worthy being as worthy of our every action 
being an act of worship in a more or less direct sense.  
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How might this be the case? Consider the possibilities of superimposition or 
supervenience. Ninian Smart reflects on the relevance of the concept of superimposition 
for any account of worship:  
For even though sweeping a room may count as a form of worship, this is only 
seriously so when the person sweeping the room intends his action not merely as 
sweeping but also as worshipping. For him to intend this, he has to employ the 
concept of worshipping and more particularly of worshipping, say, God - and 
these concepts he basically learns elsewhere.17 
 
Perhaps there is something about the nature of intention in action that introduces a helpful 
flexibility into the concept of worship. Insofar as it is possible for any one of our 
(nonsinful) actions to also be an act of worship, then every one of our actions is eligible 
as an act of worship. For the supremely worship-worthy being to be worthy of a 
continuous or unbroken worship-attention, then, would mean the supremely worship-
worthy being would be worthy of our every action to be an act of worship in some direct 
or indirect way. A life lived in this way would amount to a singular act of worship or a 
succession of acts of worship one after the other.  
It is not clear whether any of the available concepts of attention can deliver on 
any one of our actions being eligible as acts of worship. Attention is a relatively new 
topic of serious philosophical and scientific interest, and I do not wish to hang the success 
of this project on what would amount to a controversial position on what attention is. For 
instance, understanding continuous attention in the way above would require committing 
myself to some view of attention where attention can be partial. If the cognitive unison 
account of attention is true, the above defense must be false because it would not allow 
that attention to be directed to the supremely worship-worthy being if all other relevant 
                                                
17. Smart, The Concept of Worship, 5.  
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cognitive faculties are not aiding the task of worship. Even an account of attention that 
permits degrees presents difficulties. It is difficult to imagine that someone whose 
concentration is devoted to a task as mentally taxing as defusing a live bomb or 
presenting an argument in court in defense of a man believed to be innocent could in any 
meaningful sense have some degree of attention reserved for the supremely worship-
worthy being—much less whatever degree of attention would be requisite for worship. 
Arguably, in worshipping the supremely worship-worthy being, the supremely worship-
worthy being ought to at least be the primary object of our attention even if not the sole 
object. So perhaps it is impossible to achieve undivided worship in the way above on 
phenomenological or practical grounds. 
Thinking of worship in this way is not entirely foreign to the Christian tradition, 
however. Saint Augustine says in The City of God  that “The true sacrifice, then, is every 
act done in order that we might cling to God in holy fellowship, that is, every act which is 
referred to the final good in which we can be truly blessed.”18 “But sacrifice,” says 
Aquinas commenting on Augustine, “belongs to religion…. Every virtuous deed is said to 
be a sacrifice, insofar as it is done out of reverence of God” and “Every deed, insofar as it 
is done in God’s honor, belongs to religion.”19 Thus the question is, as in the case of 
whether worship is an obedience-entailing concept—in what consists the phrases “done 
out of reverence of God” or “done in God’s honor.” A defense of the principle of 
undivided worship along the lines of the one above might be salvageable on systematic 
                                                
18. Augustine, The City of God, vol. 1 trans. William Babcock (New York: New City Press, 
2012), 310. 
19. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 81, a. 4. 
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theological grounds. To achieve the principle of undivided worship one the grounds 
above, our concept of worship would need to include some fundamental dispositional 
element such that worship would include any act involved in the general ordering of 
one’s life to the supremely worship-worthy being. Saint Paul seems to be getting at 
something along these lines: “I appeal to you therefore, brother and sisters, by the 
mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, 
which is your spiritual worship.”20 Paul seems to think that the whole of one’s life can be 
lived in such a way as to be an act of worship. Perhaps this dispositional element could 
ground the notion that any one of our acts are candidates for acts of worship insofar as 
they are “done out of reverence of God,” even if the supremely worship-worthy being is 
not the primary object of our attention in some mentally taxing act. It is not within the 
scope of this project to tease out how this might be the case philosophically. As far as the 
parameters of this project are concerned, I consider this problem to be in the same boat as 
the obedience-entailing or nonobedience-entailing problem in the concept of worship. It 
is a second order issue in worship-worthiness.21 
 Consider another way of understanding the continuous element of undivided 
worship. Continuous attention could also refer to performing an act of worship at any 
moment where worshiping is a possible or reasonable thing to do. “Continuous” or 
“unbroken” in this sense is continuous in the way perfect attendance or an on-base 
percentage can be continuous or unbroken. Perfect school attendance does not mean that 
a student never leaves the school. Neither does 1000% on base percentage mean that a 
                                                
20. Rom. 12:1. 
21. There will be occasion to reflect on this issue in the conclusion. 
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player never steps foot off the bag. Rather, the continuous or unbroken character of 
perfect attendance or a 1000% on-base percentage refers to the reality that in every 
instance where there is an opportunity to attend school or to reach base, a student or 
player succeeds in attending school or reaching base.  
In the case of an example more proximate to worship, a man may love his spouse 
maximally insofar as he expresses his love for his spouse at every opportunity (“every 
opportunity” reasonably construed) to express his love. It would not be the case that 
every one of his actions could count as an expression of love for his spouse, but this does 
not count against his love any more than a baseball player’s going out to dinner would 
count against his OBP or a student’s not attending school during summer break counts 
against her perfect attendance. Importantly, “at every opportunity” includes a vast range 
of kinds of actions at varying degrees of sacrifice. Expressing his love at every 
opportunity may mean cooking dinner when his spouse is tired. It would include resisting 
the temptation to perform some act that would count against his love such as romantically 
engaging some person other than his spouse. Adequately expressing his maximal love 
may also mean laying down his life when his spouse’s life is threatened.  
Similarly, undivided worship would include a singular attention over any one act 
of worship and an unbroken attention where “unbroken” refers to a singular attention at 
every opportunity (reasonably construed) to worship. The qualifier “reasonably 
construed” merits comment. I take “reasonably construed” to mean that “every 
opportunity” to worship is qualified by what other legitimate reasons one has not to 
worship in any given moment. Along these lines, what would count as an adequate 
expression of worship of the supremely worship-worthy being would vary from person to 
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person. A single mother of five working multiple jobs to put food on the table is not 
failing to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being if the only opportunity 
she has to worship where worshipping would not occur at the expense of fulfilling her 
obligations to her children is once a week on Sunday mornings.22 If a person is seriously 
ill or impaired in such a way that there are significantly fewer opportunities for that 
person to worship than one who is well, they are not failing to adequately worship the 
supremely worship-worthy being if the disparity between the number of opportunities to 
worship for one who is well and one who is not can be accounted for by the impairment. 
A defense of the sort I have offered above is flexible enough to cover the case of the 
single mother as well as the monk who has dedicated his life to prayer and worship. 
“Every opportunity” for the cloistered monk would amount to significantly more 
opportunities than for the single mother.  
As in the case of the man who wishes to adequately express his maximal love for 
his spouse where doing so includes expressing his love at every opportunity to express 
his love, there are a multitude of kinds of expressions at varying levels of sacrifice that 
may take place in worshipping the supremely worship-worthy being at every opportunity 
to worship. Suppose one has an additional fifteen minutes at the start of the day before 
leaving the house for work than originally planned. Instead of spending these fifteen 
minutes scrolling through social media, this person takes this time as an opportunity to 
worship the supremely worship-worthy being in some way. Giving up fifteen minutes of 
                                                
22. It is worth noting here again that, on systematic theological grounds, it may even be the case 
that this mother’s actions in caring for her children are acts of worship. The difficulty is in determining how 
one can refer to God (as an act of worship must) in acting in certain ways towards persons. The Gospel of 
Matthew points us in a possible direction: “And the king will answer them, ‘Truly I tell you, just as you did 
it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me.’” (25:40).  
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social media time does not amount to all that much of a sacrifice or reflect a great 
intensity of expression.23 One could imagine more costly examples. 
More to the point of this section, to adequately worship the supremely worship-
worthy being would include organizing one’s life in a way where there are maximal 
opportunities to worship (reasonably construed) and a requirement not to worship another 
being. Any opportunity to worship a being is an opportunity to worship the supremely 
worship-worthy being. But for any opportunity to worship the supremely worship-worthy 
being, the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of worship at that particular 
moment. So to worship another being would be to fail to worship the supremely worship-
worthy being at an opportunity to worship the supremely worship-worthy being. Insofar 
as the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of worship at every opportunity to 
worship, worshipping another being would count as a mark against adequately 
worshipping the supremely worship-worthy being. 
It is important to keep in mind the contingency of the strong formulation of the 
principle of undivided worship. When I say that adequately worshiping the supremely 
worship-worthy being would include a requirement not to worship another being, what I 
am not saying is that this amounts to an all-things-considered type of obligation. It is only 
a requirement in the sense of its entailment in the notion of adequately worshipping the 
supremely worship-worthy being. To establish an all-things-considered sort of obligation 
not to worship another being, one would need to show why there might be an all-things-
                                                
23. I am not suggesting here that to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being one 
must spend every moment of free time worshipping. The reasonable construal of “every opportunity” 
would account for the importance of leisure, rest, socializing, and vocation. As with most things of 
importance, the appropriate balance requires wisdom and discernment.  
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considered sort of obligation to adequately worship the supremely worship-worthy being. 
I have restricted my defense and explanation to the strong formulation and thus 
consciously avoided the language of obligation or requiring reasons.  
Conclusion  
There are a great number of things that could be said to be unique about worship-
worthiness in the supreme case. For instance, adequately worshiping the supremely 
worship-worthy being might include a requirement against a range of kinds of actions or 
attitudes that would count against adequate worship. Insofar as one is prideful, one is 
failing in some moment to acknowledge the importance or value of one’s own life 
relative to the supremely worship-worthy being. Adequately worshiping the supremely 
worship-worthy being, then, might entail a requirement against pridefulness.  
The purpose of this chapter, however, was to provide an explanation and defense 
of what I take to be two principal features of supreme worship-worthiness: necessary 
worship-worthiness and the principle of undivided worship. The guiding intuition in 
discerning these two features is the notion that to be supremely worship-worthy is to be 
that being than which there is not a more worship-worthy on the scale of worship-
worthiness. The supremely worship-worthy being would have those properties requisite 
to satisfy this description. First, to be worthy of worship of any rational being with the 
necessary capacities is to be more worship-worthy than to be worthy of only some 
portion of those beings. Accordingly, to be necessarily worship-worthy is a key feature of 
supreme worship-worthiness. The intuition behind the principle of undivided worship is 
that to be the sole worship-worthy being is to be more worship-worthy than to be a 
worship-worthy being among other worship-worthy beings. To cash out this intuition, I 
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proceeded in a somewhat circuitous fashion. I isolated the concept of attention as a key 
feature of the concept of worship, showing that the supremely worship-worthy being 
would be worthy of singular and a continuous worship-attention where “singular” and 
“continuous” deliver on the notion of the supremely worship-worthy being as worthy of 








 The principal aim of this thesis has been to explore the relationship between 
worship-worthiness and absolute perfection. I have argued that absolute perfection 
occupies a unique position within the concept of worship-worthiness. To be absolutely 
perfect is to be supremely worship-worthy. To attain supreme worship-worthiness is to 
pass a threshold that makes it qualitatively different from any other instance of worship-
worthiness both in that to be supremely worship-worthy is to be necessarily worthy of 
worship and to be the one being to qualify for undivided worship.  
 To accomplish this, in the second chapter I argued for what I consider the key 
consideration for worship-worthiness: to be worthy of worship by some agent is to have 
satisfied the sufficient value inequality condition. This criterion states that to be worthy 
of worship is to be absurdly greater in value than a would-be worshipper. Along these 
lines, I attempted to tease apart the concept of worship-worthiness from the concept of 
God in order to become clearer about what the concept means independently of its 
association with God. Teasing apart worship-worthiness from the concept of God yielded 
a multivalent concept of worship-worthiness—that is, I argued for a notion of worship-
worthiness that is not an all-or-nothing property. On this account, it is possible to be 
worthy of worship without being absolutely perfect. 
 In the third chapter I used the multivalence of worship-worthiness to reach 
supreme worship-worthiness and show what is unique about this particular instance. I 
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argued that supreme worship-worthiness entails a maximally stable worship-worthiness 
status and thus necessary worship-worthiness. There is no possible world where the 
supremely worship-worthy being is not worship-worthy of any rational agent with the 
requisite capacities for worship. I also argued that to be supremely worship-worthy is to 
be uniquely worship-worthy insofar as the supremely worship-worthy being is worthy of 
an undivided worship. In particular, I advanced the strong version of the principle of 
undivided worship where this principle means that to adequately worship the supremely 
worship-worthy being is to worship the supremely worship-worthy being singularly and 
continuously.  
 There are a number of ways this project might naturally be continued into further 
reflection. I have already mentioned the importance of the obedience-entailing or 
nonobedience-entailing issue in the concept of worship as a second order issue in 
worship-worthiness. Along these lines, there is much work to be done on the relationship 
between worship-worthiness and divine authority. Mark Murphy has helpfully laid out 
the relevant considerations in a chapter titled “Worship-Worthiness and Allegiance-
Worthiness” in God’s Own Ethics.1 His work here and in his monograph on divine 
authority merit further engagement on this front. Adjacent areas of interest might be to 
pursue the relationship between worship and neighboring concepts such as devotion, 
gratitude, and love.  
 Another potentially fruitful area to pursue with respect to the work done in this 
project would be to explore what relevance the concept of worship-worthiness does, in 
fact, have for the concept of God and vice versa. I have consciously attempted to treat the 
                                                
1. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 129-46.  
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issue of developing an account of worship-worthiness as separate from method in perfect 
being theology. At the least, we ought to have a functioning concept of worship-
worthiness formed independently from operative assumptions about what God must be 
like. Otherwise, it is difficult to see in what way it is useful in this respect. I have noted 
the ways that I find inadvisable when it comes to using worship-worthiness to yield 
results for the concept of God. But I think it would go too far to say that the concept of 
worship-worthiness has zero bearing on how we go about thinking about our concept of 
God. 
For instance, I have noted that Nagasawa’s monograph, Maximal God: A New 
Defense of Perfect Being Theism, was a primary inspiration for this thesis. The core of 
the perfect being thesis, according to Nagasawa, is that God is the greatest possible being. 
And while “greatest possible being” may refer to the being who instantiates the set of 
omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence, it may be the case that these properties 
cannot possibly be co-instantiated because of any number of classical problems in perfect 
being theology (the problem of evil, incoherence of an attribute). If this turned out to be 
the case, we should simply revise our concept of God to accommodate the issue. Should 
we find the problem of evil insurmountable, for example, perhaps we should conclude—
rather than that God does not exist—that “the greatest possible being” would not include 
omnipotence. The greatest possible being, then, would not be the absolutely perfect 
being. 
 There is a level of indeterminacy to this concept of God insofar as it is 
indefinitely revisable. Should we encounter a roadblock that appears we cannot find our 
way around, we should drop God’s greatness a tier rather than give up on the enterprise 
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of perfect being theology. But this seems to leave open the content of the divine identity. 
God might be omnipotent, for example. But on Nagasawa’s account, God could fall far 
short of omnipotence.  
 Because the identity of the object of worship is the key consideration constitutive 
of the worship-worthiness judgment, this indeterminacy creates a number of substantial 
problems.2 This implicit agnosticism about what God is actually like creates issues both 
for successful reference and introduces an instability to the worship-worthiness judgment. 
If our concept of God is indefinitely revisable, so too is the basis of our worship-
worthiness judgments. The content of the divine identity ought to be stable enough for us 
such that we do not run the risk of having committed idolatry or performed unfitting 
worship acts in revising our understanding of God’s identify from one set of properties to 
another. There is no mechanism in place to ensure we do not moderate our concept of 
God too soon. How, under Nagasawa’s method, are we to know when to press further in 
our investigation to resolve a given issue and when to moderate? In the former case, we 
would have found the solution and continued to direct our worship to the actual God.  
 Second, Nagasawa notes the concern traditional perfect being theists might have 
with his account in that it is possible for maximal God to turn out less worship-worthy 
than omni God or, on the maximal excellence account, not worship-worthy at all: “Few 
perfect being theists would be willing to accept the maximal God approach if it can entail 
                                                
2. For instance, Peter Geach argues about love of God: “But cannot love unite a man to God 
despite any amount of intellectual error? I do not think so…. A man’s love for a woman, however much it 
means to him, scarcely latches on to her if his acquaintance with her is extremely slight, if she is for him a 
princesse lointaine, if he has fantastic misconceptions of her actual characteristics.” See Peter Geach, God 




that God is not worshipworthy.”3 I have shown that Nagasawa’s response to this (the one 
trivial proposition objection) is not all that problematic on the account of worship-
worthiness defended in this thesis. We can concede the multivalence of worship-
worthiness and potentially still make trouble for Nagasawa’s defense of perfect being 
theism with the worship-worthiness problem insofar as to be absolutely perfect is to be 
exceedingly more worship-worthy than any other worship-worthy being. 
 Would this mean, however, that worship-worthiness can in fact be used as a 
criterion in perfect being theology? Jeff Speaks suggests as much. For Speaks, “the claim 
that God is the greatest possible being does not capture the core of our conception of 
God. At best, it can capture the core of our conception of God only if it is combined with 
certain theses about modal space.”4 As Nagasawa’s approach illustrates, “the greatest 
possible being” does not guarantee that God is sufficiently great to be God unless it is 
partnered with certain assumptions about what it is possible to be. 
One way to show that this is a mistake is to imagine that, at the end of the 
universe, it turns out that Michael Jordan was the most impressive being to have 
ever existed. Then atheism is true, because, as it turns out, the universe did not 
turn out to include any being great enough to be God. Being the best would not 
make Jordan God; so the claim that God is the greatest actual being does not 
capture the core of our conception of God.5 
 
Convinced that the perfect being thesis and the existence proofs of natural theology 
ultimately fail to deliver divine attributes, Speaks suggests a number of possible ways 
forward:  
                                                
3. Nagasawa, Maximal God, 105 
4. Jeff Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 121. 
5. Jeff Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 122-23. 
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It is then hard to see how we can get started theorizing about the attributes of God 
without bringing to bear substantial assumptions about God which are themselves 
neither conceptual truths nor knowable by reason alone. It seems inevitable then 
that our reasoning about the attributes of God will be somewhat parochial, in the 
sense that it will be guided by theses about God which not all believers in God 
will be willing to endorse…. 
For instance, one might take as one’s foundational attribute the property of being 
capable of offering human beings genuine salvation; or the property of being a 
suitable object of faith; or the property of being deserving of worship. (Though 
we should not pretend that the claims that God has these properties are conceptual 
truths.) Of course, properties like these do already play a role in theorizing about 
the attributes in contemporary philosophy of religion. But a philosophical 
theology which put properties like these, rather than the property of being the 
greatest possible being, at the center would look quite a bit different.6 
It seems to me then, that, if Speaks is right about the insufficiency of the perfect being 
thesis in its classical formulations to deliver a guarantee of sufficient greatness (and I do 
not know that he is), it is an open question as to the usefulness of the concept of worship-
worthiness as a criterion in philosophical theology. In developing the account of worship-
worthiness, I have conceded the possibility that there is no worship-worthiness that is not 
necessary worship-worthiness and thus no worship-worthy being who is not absolutely 
perfect. If this account of worship-worthiness could be formed independently of operative 
assumptions about what God must be like, perhaps there is a usefulness as a criterion so 
long as God’s own nature is not characterized relationally in a metaphysical sense. 
Importantly, it appears to me also, as Speaks suggests, that the extent to which we can 
investigate worship and worship-worthiness with philosophical rigor is an open question. 
Independent of other confessional commitments, it may be that we max out philosophical 
                                                
6. Jeff Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 156-57. Jerome Gellman suggests a similar 
procedure—a procedure that will deliver a “religiously adequate” conception of God. For Gellman, a 
religiously adequate conception of God would be one where God is that being for whom it would be most 
appropriate to love “with a love than which there can be no greater.” Jerome Gellman, “God: A Perfectly 
Good Being,” (forthcoming). This criterion, argues Gellman, would deliver all the other religiously salient 
attributes of God even if it does not yield perfection simpliciter. 
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insight into this notion sooner than we might hope in terms of its relationship to the 
formation of our concept of God. I am not certain one way or the other. 
Another natural extension of this project would be to explore the implications of a 
justifying reasons account of worship-worthiness for the requiring reasons case. Saint 
Anselm argues in the conclusion of the Monologion:  
It is to the supreme essence alone that we properly give the name God…. This is 
the kind of substance that is so pre-eminently valuable that people have to 
worship it: the kind of substance that one ought to pray to for help against the 
forces that threaten. And what is so valuable as to be worshipped, what is to be 
prayed to—for anything—so much as the supremely good and supremely 
powerful spirit that dominates and regulates all things.7 
 
But what might it mean to owe God worship? One would need to have decisive 
reasons to worship God where failing to act on these decisive reasons would be 
unreasonable or impermissible. Would the requiring reasons case need additional reasons 
beyond what I have argued are justifying reasons? Or are the justifying reasons identical 
to the requiring reasons, as Anselm seems to indicate here? That is, is God’s absolute 
perfection, his being “pre-eminently valuable,” sufficient to ground a requirement to 
worship? What about a strong requirement to not worship any being other than God? I 
have argued that to worship the supremely worship-worthy being adequately, or, in a way 
that meaningfully corresponds to his greatness, would be to worship the supremely 
worship-worthy being alone. But what might be decisive reasons to adequately worship 
the supremely worship-worthy being? More work needs to be done here at the 
                                                
7. Anselm, Monologion, 80. 
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intersections of value theory and philosophical theology/analytic theology as the subject 
is ripe for fruitful conversation.8  
The final area of further engagement I will note is the relevance of thicker 
metaphysical commitments or concepts of God for an account of worship-worthiness. 
Throughout, I have not appealed to attributes such as simplicity or participation models 
of value to advance my case. But if simplicity is a possible attribute or participatory 
metaphysics a coherent model for understanding value, they are immanently relevant to 
an account of worship-worthiness.  
 For instance, being the only noncomposite being might be one way that the 
supremely worship-worthy being could have a maximally stable worship-worthiness 
status (necessary worship-worthiness). In the case of simplicity, the value gap is as wide 
as it could possibly be in that it is in principle not traversable. In forgoing the 
metaphysical commitments that would be required to make this case, I have allowed the 
supremely worship-worthy being to be, in some sense, in competition with other beings 
where each being exists on a single scale of value. But there is a qualitative difference 
between a simple being whose value is “through itself,” as Anselm would say, or 
underived, and a being who has a certain value in virtue of a being other than himself or 
through something else. Thus divine simplicity and a participation model of value might 
be one way to guarantee the requisite value gap for necessary worship-worthiness.9  
                                                
8. Murphy has suggested that the question of worship-worthiness and the obligation to worship are 
as different as the question of whether a joke is funny and whether one should laugh at it. Others have 
offered similar analogies. For instance, Bayne and Nagasawa note that “someone could refuse to admire 
Michelangelo’s David despite acknowledging that the David is the sort of thing that it is reasonable to 
admire.” Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 129; Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 303. I am 
doubtful as to the aptness of these analogies. 
9. Note how, in this case, it seems that Nagasawa’s one trivial proposition objection does not even 
get off the ground. If simplicity is an attribute of an absolutely perfect being, there is no such thing as a 
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What is more, in the case of a simple being, we may have a grounding for the 
strongest version of the principle of undivided worship where the existence of a simple 
being places a metaphysical constraint on the range of value that might be exhibited by 
other beings. If a simple being existed, it most likely would be the case that the only 
being deserving of worship would be the supremely worship-worthy being insofar as in a 
world where a simple being exists, the simple being would be the only being to exhibit an 
underived value. It would not be the case then, that there might exist some being so 
impressive as to fail to satisfy the sufficient value inequality condition with respect to the 
supremely worship-worthy being because any being that would exist other than the 
supremely worship-worthy being would be on the created side of the uncreated/created 
distinction.10   
                                                
nearly perfect being. Any being other than the supremely worship-worthy being would be valuable in virtue 
of its “borrowing” value from the supremely worship-worthy being. 
10. Additionally, there may be a way to ground the more expansive and inclusive notion of 
worship in the notion that God is goodness itself. On the classical notion, our wills are oriented towards the 
good. It may be on this notion that every one of our actions are candidates for acts of worship insofar as we 
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